HAITI: Deportees from U.S. Face Culture Shock, Retain Hope
By Michael Deibert
Inter Press Service
(Read the original article here)
PORT-AU-PRINCE, Jul 8, 2009 (IPS) - In the shadow of the Eglise Sainte Claire in the Petite Place Cazeau neighbourhood of Haiti’s bustling capital, Frantz Saintil is visiting his daughter and reflecting on the more than two decades he spent abroad before finding himself back in his native country of Haiti seven years ago.
"It didn’t take me long to become very Americanised," says Saintil, 34, who left Haiti for Canada and eventually the United States with his family when he was six years old.
"I like baseball and apple pie and everything American. I didn’t want to be identified as Haitian and discriminated against. I didn’t understand their way of dress, their musical preferences. I was more into rock, some R&B, country music. I didn’t identify with them at all."
Saintil is one of 3,250 Haitians that Department of Homeland Security figures show were deported from the United States back to Haiti on the basis of criminal convictions between 1997 and 2005. A soft-spoken man who was a permanent legal resident when a nolo contendere ("no contest") plea to an assault charge in Colorado landed him in prison at 19, after serving his sentence Saintil was subsequently deported to Haiti, a country he barely knew.
"When you don’t identify yourself as an immigrant or a foreigner, it’s when you get in trouble that all these things come to fruition," says Saintil of his experience with the U.S. justice system, speaking a measured, American-accented English in contrast to the boisterous Kreyol being shouted at a nearby football match.
"When you realise that you’re detained to be deported, then you start to identify (as Haitian), at that point you can’t deny it," he said.
Saintil is not alone. A recent study by the 15-member Caribbean Community (CARICOM) found, upon analysing deportation data from Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, that almost 30,000 criminal offenders had been deported to those countries between 1990 and 2005.
Even more strikingly, according to migration data in El Salvador, between 2006 and 2008 some 14,608 deportees with criminal records were sent back from the U.S. to the Central American country of 7 million, home to such transnational criminal syndicates as the Mara Salvatrucha and a nation with one of the world’s highest homicide rates.
It is thus a delicate issue, with deportees who have left their birth countries at very young ages - and having become culturally and linguistically American - being digested through the U.S. prison system and then spit out to their familial homelands only to confront a wall of mutual misunderstanding.
According to figures supplied by the Centre Oecuménique des Droits de l'Homme (the Ecumenical Centre for Human Rights or CEDH), a Haitian human rights group, the average age of deportees when they left Haiti was between four and seven years old.
Having become assimilated in the United States, deportees suffered severe culture shock when returning to Haiti, where a lifestyle unfamiliar to most is expressed in a language that only a few had been able to master with any degree of proficiency while abroad.
"What we request from the authorities of Canada and the U.S. is to take into account the family factor when considering the nature of the delinquency which leads to the decision of deportation," says CEDH’s director, Jean-Claude Bajeux. "And it is essential that the governments involved in a policy of returning people to Haiti make an evaluation of the precarious situation in this country."
Add to the mix Haiti's dire economic condition - with 80 percent of the population living under the poverty line and GDP per capita of just 1,300 dollars per year - and periodic political unrest that sees politicians only too willing to use pools of jobless young men as muscle in the country’s political wars, one quickly sees how the deportees, or dp’s, as they call themselves, marked with the stigma of forced exit from a country that many Haitians regard as the promised land, have a tough row to hoe once they step off the plane in Port-au-Prince.
In December 2006, for example, with no hard evidence supporting his claim, then-Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis blamed deportees from the U.S. for helping to spur the country's at-the-time spiraling kidnapping rates. The fearsome reputation of such gangs as Florida’s Zoe Pound, a Haitian-identified clique that specialises in robbing drug dealers of their product and money, often with extreme violence, only adds to the trepidation with which local Haitians view the deportees.
It is a reputation that some among their number feel is undeserved.
"If there was a way to integrate us into society, it wouldn’t be such a hardship on us," says Junior Telusca, who moved with his family to Florida at age three and was returned to Haiti after doing two years in prison on a drug conviction. "There’s only one thing I want, and that’s to integrate into this society, to get a job, pay for my child’s school and live my life."
Deportees often mix a certain wistfulness for the land they have been exiled from with a stated desire to try and gain some sort of advantage, both spiritual and material, from their particular status. In recent years, local organisations such as the Fondation haïtienne des familles des rapatriés have attempted to build some sort of solidarity among the newly-returned.
In tandem with Haiti's Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Interior, the International Organisation for Migration has recently developed a program focusing on deportee reintegration into Haitian society that focuses on such aspects as micro-enterprise support and language training.
But for many, it has been anything but an easy lesson.
"Life in the States is great, in all senses of the word," says Frantz Saintil. "But if you get a second chance to be free, then you’ve got to make the best of it. If I can affect the life of even one person, even it is by teaching them English, to me that is a big step. There is no telling what that person might become."
"And I am hopeful that one day I will get to see the United States again," he added.
Michael Deibert is the author of Notes from the Last Testament: The Struggle for Haiti (Seven Stories Press).
Wednesday, July 08, 2009
Saturday, July 04, 2009
Manufactured diversity
Manufactured diversity
Published: June 12, 2009
Foreign Direct Investment
(Read the original article here)
The economies of north Africa’s Maghreb region – Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia – are branching out into manufacturing as the demand for hydrocarbon exports continues to decline, writes Michael Deibert.
A ribbon of countries along Africa’s northern expanse have begun to make their mark on the world’s manufacturing landscape. It is a development occurring at the same time that the export value of the region’s hydrocarbon exports has taken a dip.
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia – often collectively referred to as the Maghreb (meaning ‘place of sunset’) – along with Libya have a combined population of 84 million people. They have all proved adept at attracting a combination of transportation and electronics manufacturers, a development that could significantly diversify the region’s economy and opportunities for foreign investment.
Opening trade barriers
With their easy access to the Mediterranean Sea and its trade routes to Europe, the Maghreb countries made natural signatories to the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements with the EU. Comprised of a series of measures designed to guarantee free access to European markets and exemption from customs duties, the agreements have deepened the region’s trade links with Europe. Libya, however, declined to sign.
Since 2006, Tunisian printed circuits company Fuba Tunisia, which specialises in electronics and telecommunications, has emerged in the country’s capital, Tunis, as a spin-off of the German digital firm Fuba Printed Circuits GMBH. Over the past two years, Fuba Tunisia has completed a modernisation worth nearly $10m and expanded its plant in Bizerta for an operation with export revenues of about $40m. It supplies companies such as Alcatel, Bosch, Delphi, Siemens and Schneider.
Tunisia’s manufacturing expansion is not limited to electronics. In 2010, Airbus is slated to open a Tunisian factory that will employ 1500 workers at a cost of $76m.
Despite president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali having ruled the country as a virtually unchallenged authoritarian since 1987, Tunisia boasts a burgeoning middle class and has experienced an annual average economic growth rate of 5% over the past decade.
“Tunisia has a fairly diversified economy and manufacturing base,” says Andrew Atkinson, an analyst with Paris-based Euler Hermes, a credit insurance provider that devises country risk assessments. “There’s a clear pecking order in the risk appetite for dealing with these countries.”
Out of a possible rating of AA, Tunisia scores a BB on the Euler Hermes scale, Morocco ranks as a solid B, and Algeria and Libya are Cs.
Next on the risk scale of foreign investment in the region is Morocco. The country’s King Mohammed, who took over in 1999 after his father, King Hassan II, has presided over deals with France for civilian and military contracts totalling more than €2bn. These deals include the construction of a high-speed train between the coastal cities of Tangiers and Casablanca, and the construction of a power plant outside the north-eastern city of Oujda.
Morocco is also enjoying playing host to Geneva-based semiconductor company ST Microelectronics, which has expanded its integrated circuit design and development centre in Morocco’s capital city of Rabat.
Algeria and Libya lag behind
Awash with oil and natural gas reserves, Algeria and Libya have been slower to industrialise their economies, but the worldwide economic turmoil may accelerate that process.
“If you look at Algeria and Libya, both economies are absolutely dependent on hydrocarbon exports for revenues,” says Craig McMahon, North Africa analyst at Wood Mackenzie, a UK-based consulting firm that closely follows the energy market. “The biggest issue [for them] has been the drop-off in oil and gas prices. They are still in a positive cash flow position but I think it’s fair to say that the scale and magnitude of drop-off has taken them by surprise.”
Algeria and Libya – both members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) – may find the precipitous drop in oil prices over the past year a driving force in the diversification of the region’s economy. Amid the global economic downturn, demand for oil has remained weak, with prices hovering near $50 a barrel for months. OPEC expects the decline in demand to continue.
Having struggled with the scourge of Islamic militancy for years, Algeria appears to have successfully extricated itself from an agonising decade-long civil war that pitted Islamic militants against the Algerian government following disputed 1991 legislative elections. Against a backdrop of quelling the activities of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, supported strongly by the military, won 90% of the vote in Algeria’s April presidential elections. This secured him another five-year mandate in an election boycotted by one of the main opposition groups.
Notable business activity in the country includes Algerian electronic manufacturer ENIE collaborating with the Spanish renewable energies companies Isofoton and Alsolar to construct a $50m thermal energy plant, which will be the nation’s first.
Libya’s new direction
Farthest east, Libya’s president, Muammar Gaddafi, has succeeded to a degree in ingratiating himself with Europe and the US following Libya’s 2003 announcement that it was abandoning its nuclear weapons programme.
The country’s capital, Tripoli, has hosted visits by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU’s commissioner for external relations, for discussions on how to increase energy and trade relations between the two zones. Libya’s recent acceptance to the World Trade Organization will likely make such steps all the easier.
The important thing for investors to remember, observers say, is that, as can be discerned from their level of involvement with foreign investment, all the countries of North Africa maintain distinct personalities, despite their cultural links.
“You’ve got significant differences in terms of size of the economy, population, exchange rates and political systems,” says Euler Hermes’ Mr Atkinson. “These countries tend to act independently, and any sort of dealings are probably best done on a country-by-country basis.”
Published: June 12, 2009
Foreign Direct Investment
(Read the original article here)
The economies of north Africa’s Maghreb region – Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia – are branching out into manufacturing as the demand for hydrocarbon exports continues to decline, writes Michael Deibert.
A ribbon of countries along Africa’s northern expanse have begun to make their mark on the world’s manufacturing landscape. It is a development occurring at the same time that the export value of the region’s hydrocarbon exports has taken a dip.
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia – often collectively referred to as the Maghreb (meaning ‘place of sunset’) – along with Libya have a combined population of 84 million people. They have all proved adept at attracting a combination of transportation and electronics manufacturers, a development that could significantly diversify the region’s economy and opportunities for foreign investment.
Opening trade barriers
With their easy access to the Mediterranean Sea and its trade routes to Europe, the Maghreb countries made natural signatories to the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements with the EU. Comprised of a series of measures designed to guarantee free access to European markets and exemption from customs duties, the agreements have deepened the region’s trade links with Europe. Libya, however, declined to sign.
Since 2006, Tunisian printed circuits company Fuba Tunisia, which specialises in electronics and telecommunications, has emerged in the country’s capital, Tunis, as a spin-off of the German digital firm Fuba Printed Circuits GMBH. Over the past two years, Fuba Tunisia has completed a modernisation worth nearly $10m and expanded its plant in Bizerta for an operation with export revenues of about $40m. It supplies companies such as Alcatel, Bosch, Delphi, Siemens and Schneider.
Tunisia’s manufacturing expansion is not limited to electronics. In 2010, Airbus is slated to open a Tunisian factory that will employ 1500 workers at a cost of $76m.
Despite president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali having ruled the country as a virtually unchallenged authoritarian since 1987, Tunisia boasts a burgeoning middle class and has experienced an annual average economic growth rate of 5% over the past decade.
“Tunisia has a fairly diversified economy and manufacturing base,” says Andrew Atkinson, an analyst with Paris-based Euler Hermes, a credit insurance provider that devises country risk assessments. “There’s a clear pecking order in the risk appetite for dealing with these countries.”
Out of a possible rating of AA, Tunisia scores a BB on the Euler Hermes scale, Morocco ranks as a solid B, and Algeria and Libya are Cs.
Next on the risk scale of foreign investment in the region is Morocco. The country’s King Mohammed, who took over in 1999 after his father, King Hassan II, has presided over deals with France for civilian and military contracts totalling more than €2bn. These deals include the construction of a high-speed train between the coastal cities of Tangiers and Casablanca, and the construction of a power plant outside the north-eastern city of Oujda.
Morocco is also enjoying playing host to Geneva-based semiconductor company ST Microelectronics, which has expanded its integrated circuit design and development centre in Morocco’s capital city of Rabat.
Algeria and Libya lag behind
Awash with oil and natural gas reserves, Algeria and Libya have been slower to industrialise their economies, but the worldwide economic turmoil may accelerate that process.
“If you look at Algeria and Libya, both economies are absolutely dependent on hydrocarbon exports for revenues,” says Craig McMahon, North Africa analyst at Wood Mackenzie, a UK-based consulting firm that closely follows the energy market. “The biggest issue [for them] has been the drop-off in oil and gas prices. They are still in a positive cash flow position but I think it’s fair to say that the scale and magnitude of drop-off has taken them by surprise.”
Algeria and Libya – both members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) – may find the precipitous drop in oil prices over the past year a driving force in the diversification of the region’s economy. Amid the global economic downturn, demand for oil has remained weak, with prices hovering near $50 a barrel for months. OPEC expects the decline in demand to continue.
Having struggled with the scourge of Islamic militancy for years, Algeria appears to have successfully extricated itself from an agonising decade-long civil war that pitted Islamic militants against the Algerian government following disputed 1991 legislative elections. Against a backdrop of quelling the activities of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, supported strongly by the military, won 90% of the vote in Algeria’s April presidential elections. This secured him another five-year mandate in an election boycotted by one of the main opposition groups.
Notable business activity in the country includes Algerian electronic manufacturer ENIE collaborating with the Spanish renewable energies companies Isofoton and Alsolar to construct a $50m thermal energy plant, which will be the nation’s first.
Libya’s new direction
Farthest east, Libya’s president, Muammar Gaddafi, has succeeded to a degree in ingratiating himself with Europe and the US following Libya’s 2003 announcement that it was abandoning its nuclear weapons programme.
The country’s capital, Tripoli, has hosted visits by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU’s commissioner for external relations, for discussions on how to increase energy and trade relations between the two zones. Libya’s recent acceptance to the World Trade Organization will likely make such steps all the easier.
The important thing for investors to remember, observers say, is that, as can be discerned from their level of involvement with foreign investment, all the countries of North Africa maintain distinct personalities, despite their cultural links.
“You’ve got significant differences in terms of size of the economy, population, exchange rates and political systems,” says Euler Hermes’ Mr Atkinson. “These countries tend to act independently, and any sort of dealings are probably best done on a country-by-country basis.”
Friday, July 03, 2009
Q&A: "The Elites Are Like a Huge Elephant Sitting on Haiti"
Q&A: "The Elites Are Like a Huge Elephant Sitting on Haiti"
Michael Deibert interviews Haitian Prime Minister MICHÈLE PIERRE-LOUIS
Inter Press Service
(Read the original article here)
PORT-AU-PRINCE, Jul 3, 2009 (IPS) - Haitian Prime Minister Michèle Pierre-Louis assumed office in September 2008. Born in the southern city of Jérémie in 1947, she left Haiti with her family in 1964 following a pogrom by dictator François Duvalier against his perceived enemies in her town.
Studying in the United States and France before returning to Haiti in 1977, she has been a close confidante of Haitian President René Préval for over 40 years. After having worked in a variety of private and public sector jobs in Haiti, she and Préval opened a bakery which catered to the poor in Haiti’s capital in 1982.
Active in the first government of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Pierre-Louis was among the first to denounce the 1991 military coup against Aristide during an interview with Radio France Internationale.
After Aristide’s return by a U.S.-led multinational force in 1994, Pierre-Louis opened the Fondasyon Konesans Ak Libète (Knowledge and Freedom Foundation or FOKAL) in 1995 with support from businessman and philanthropist George Soros’ Open Society Institute.
An organisation conceived to support sectors in Haitian society most likely to bring about social change, FOKAL has been responsible for the creation of a network of over 50 community libraries throughout Haiti, a cultural centre and library for economically disadvantaged children and youths in Haiti’s capital, a debate programme for young people, and an initiative to supply running water to the nearly 80 percent of Haitians who don’t have regular access to it.
Since her installation as Prime Minister, Pierre-Louis has presided over a stabilising of the security situation in this often politically unstable country, weathered the fallout and relief efforts after a trio of hurricanes killed at least 600 people last year and traveled both within Haiti and internationally to plead her government’s case.
IPS contributor Michael Deibert sat down with Prime Minster Pierre-Louis in Port-au-Prince on Jun. 21 to hear her thoughts about where the country is heading.
IPS: Could you speak a little bit about your background?
MPL: I was born in Jérémie, and my parents were people extremely dedicated to the country. My father and my mother were raised during the U.S. occupation, and that whole generation was very nationalistic, it was very important to be proud of your country, to love your country, to know your country.
My involvement started very early because I was involved in youth groups against Duvalier, which at the time was very dangerous. There were lots of groups that were fighting clandestinely against the dictatorship, and I lost a lot of friends who disappeared.
One day you would hear that [the government] got them and put them in jail and you would never hear from them again. So I was marked by this situation, and even when I went to study abroad, Haiti was always in my mind.
IPS: How did you find your involvement in the first Aristide government?
MPL: It was very exhilarating, at the beginning. Everybody in the world was saying finally Haiti is going to come out, finally democracy is going to be built...When the 1991 coup occurred, I was probably the first person to give an interview and say, no matter what, the coup was unjustified. Aristide was our president and he was elected democratically and we’re going to fight for him to stay in power.
Those were very long years, and something happened to the country and to the president. When he came back, I think things got really rough, we really started going down the drain. Somehow, something very deep happened in the mind of this country, and we have not really put our finger specifically on it.
IPS: What did you feel was different after the return of Aristide in 1994?
MPL: The man himself had changed. He was married, he was into money, he was into corruption. He invented the Petits Projets de la Presidence [a corruption-riddled system of presidential largesse]. I don’t think he had escaped from the Haitian president’s syndrome, which is stay in power by all means.
There are many Haitian presidents who have fallen into that trap. Once that is your perspective and that is your project, all means are used...I don’t think we know our history very well, and we fall into the same trap over and over again. It’s unfortunate that we keep making the same mistakes
IPS: What political lessons should Haiti and the international community draw from the collapse of the second Aristide government in 2004 and the international intervention that followed?
MPL: For a long time, a lot of the elite would say that Haiti was not ready for democracy, and I was totally against that. It’s not because people are poor and they are illiterate that they are not ready for democracy. When you go to the people at the bottom, I have a deep feeling that these people really want things to change, and they are waiting for the leadership that will not bring miracles but will show them the way and not lie to them.
All the elites - the mulatto elites, the university elites, the union elites, the peasant elites - are like a huge elephant sitting on this country and you cannot move it, because there is no political class, because there are no political parties, and everyone becomes corrupted and perverted. If you can’t go into that system, the system rejects you. And so far we have not found the wrench that will move this thing.
IPS: Do you think the presence of the United Nations mission is important, and how are relations between your government and the mission?
MPL: From 1991 to 2008, there have been seven U.N. missions here, and they have all been asked for by the Haitian government. That means there is a problem.
When people say it’s a matter of sovereignty, I say that Haiti is a sovereign country and nobody change that. But in two areas, we have lost the exercise of our sovereignty: Control of the territory and food security.
We are dependent on outside forces, outside markets, for both. If we really want to do something, let’s work to recover the full capacity of our sovereignty now. That would mean really building a national public security force, and making sure we could massively invest in agriculture, which would be justice to the Haitian peasant.
When Aristide left and the interim government came in, the police were corrupt, politicized and inefficient. It takes a while before you can reverse that trend, but I think if there is one area today where we can feel the progress, it’s the police.
As Prime Minister you are also are chief of the Conseil Superieur de la Police Nationale d'Haiti, and I take that very seriously, because security is a major issue. We lack training, munitions and arms, but I think we have done a great job. It’s embarrassing to have foreign forces in your country, I am not happy about that. But if we don’t make the effort to regain our capacity to control our territory, they will stay forever.
IPS: What are your thoughts on the recent mid-term elections in Haiti?
MPL: In 2006, the population responded with dignity and order, and were proud to be part of [the elections]. And I have told those in parliament: "You are young. You want to have a career? Remember that in the past elections 95 percent of you were not returned to office. You think the people are not watching, that they are not judging? They are watching. They are not stupid."
There are hands that didn’t want these elections to take place, because it changes the configuration of the senate, which is now very powerful. Chaos is good for a few sectors, and the most destabilising factor here today is drug trafficking, whether by plane or by ship. And it’s polluting politics
The recovery of Haiti - justice system, health, education - should be planned over 10, 15, 20 years. We now have a good relationship within the region, with Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and it’s a new paradigm for regional cooperation. They have their own interests, of course, but let’s make the best of the opportunities that are offered to us.
Michael Deibert is a Senior Fellow at New York’s World Policy Institute and the author of "Notes from the Last Testament: The Struggle for Haiti" (Seven Stories Press).
Michael Deibert interviews Haitian Prime Minister MICHÈLE PIERRE-LOUIS
Inter Press Service
(Read the original article here)
PORT-AU-PRINCE, Jul 3, 2009 (IPS) - Haitian Prime Minister Michèle Pierre-Louis assumed office in September 2008. Born in the southern city of Jérémie in 1947, she left Haiti with her family in 1964 following a pogrom by dictator François Duvalier against his perceived enemies in her town.
Studying in the United States and France before returning to Haiti in 1977, she has been a close confidante of Haitian President René Préval for over 40 years. After having worked in a variety of private and public sector jobs in Haiti, she and Préval opened a bakery which catered to the poor in Haiti’s capital in 1982.
Active in the first government of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Pierre-Louis was among the first to denounce the 1991 military coup against Aristide during an interview with Radio France Internationale.
After Aristide’s return by a U.S.-led multinational force in 1994, Pierre-Louis opened the Fondasyon Konesans Ak Libète (Knowledge and Freedom Foundation or FOKAL) in 1995 with support from businessman and philanthropist George Soros’ Open Society Institute.
An organisation conceived to support sectors in Haitian society most likely to bring about social change, FOKAL has been responsible for the creation of a network of over 50 community libraries throughout Haiti, a cultural centre and library for economically disadvantaged children and youths in Haiti’s capital, a debate programme for young people, and an initiative to supply running water to the nearly 80 percent of Haitians who don’t have regular access to it.
Since her installation as Prime Minister, Pierre-Louis has presided over a stabilising of the security situation in this often politically unstable country, weathered the fallout and relief efforts after a trio of hurricanes killed at least 600 people last year and traveled both within Haiti and internationally to plead her government’s case.
IPS contributor Michael Deibert sat down with Prime Minster Pierre-Louis in Port-au-Prince on Jun. 21 to hear her thoughts about where the country is heading.
IPS: Could you speak a little bit about your background?
MPL: I was born in Jérémie, and my parents were people extremely dedicated to the country. My father and my mother were raised during the U.S. occupation, and that whole generation was very nationalistic, it was very important to be proud of your country, to love your country, to know your country.
My involvement started very early because I was involved in youth groups against Duvalier, which at the time was very dangerous. There were lots of groups that were fighting clandestinely against the dictatorship, and I lost a lot of friends who disappeared.
One day you would hear that [the government] got them and put them in jail and you would never hear from them again. So I was marked by this situation, and even when I went to study abroad, Haiti was always in my mind.
IPS: How did you find your involvement in the first Aristide government?
MPL: It was very exhilarating, at the beginning. Everybody in the world was saying finally Haiti is going to come out, finally democracy is going to be built...When the 1991 coup occurred, I was probably the first person to give an interview and say, no matter what, the coup was unjustified. Aristide was our president and he was elected democratically and we’re going to fight for him to stay in power.
Those were very long years, and something happened to the country and to the president. When he came back, I think things got really rough, we really started going down the drain. Somehow, something very deep happened in the mind of this country, and we have not really put our finger specifically on it.
IPS: What did you feel was different after the return of Aristide in 1994?
MPL: The man himself had changed. He was married, he was into money, he was into corruption. He invented the Petits Projets de la Presidence [a corruption-riddled system of presidential largesse]. I don’t think he had escaped from the Haitian president’s syndrome, which is stay in power by all means.
There are many Haitian presidents who have fallen into that trap. Once that is your perspective and that is your project, all means are used...I don’t think we know our history very well, and we fall into the same trap over and over again. It’s unfortunate that we keep making the same mistakes
IPS: What political lessons should Haiti and the international community draw from the collapse of the second Aristide government in 2004 and the international intervention that followed?
MPL: For a long time, a lot of the elite would say that Haiti was not ready for democracy, and I was totally against that. It’s not because people are poor and they are illiterate that they are not ready for democracy. When you go to the people at the bottom, I have a deep feeling that these people really want things to change, and they are waiting for the leadership that will not bring miracles but will show them the way and not lie to them.
All the elites - the mulatto elites, the university elites, the union elites, the peasant elites - are like a huge elephant sitting on this country and you cannot move it, because there is no political class, because there are no political parties, and everyone becomes corrupted and perverted. If you can’t go into that system, the system rejects you. And so far we have not found the wrench that will move this thing.
IPS: Do you think the presence of the United Nations mission is important, and how are relations between your government and the mission?
MPL: From 1991 to 2008, there have been seven U.N. missions here, and they have all been asked for by the Haitian government. That means there is a problem.
When people say it’s a matter of sovereignty, I say that Haiti is a sovereign country and nobody change that. But in two areas, we have lost the exercise of our sovereignty: Control of the territory and food security.
We are dependent on outside forces, outside markets, for both. If we really want to do something, let’s work to recover the full capacity of our sovereignty now. That would mean really building a national public security force, and making sure we could massively invest in agriculture, which would be justice to the Haitian peasant.
When Aristide left and the interim government came in, the police were corrupt, politicized and inefficient. It takes a while before you can reverse that trend, but I think if there is one area today where we can feel the progress, it’s the police.
As Prime Minister you are also are chief of the Conseil Superieur de la Police Nationale d'Haiti, and I take that very seriously, because security is a major issue. We lack training, munitions and arms, but I think we have done a great job. It’s embarrassing to have foreign forces in your country, I am not happy about that. But if we don’t make the effort to regain our capacity to control our territory, they will stay forever.
IPS: What are your thoughts on the recent mid-term elections in Haiti?
MPL: In 2006, the population responded with dignity and order, and were proud to be part of [the elections]. And I have told those in parliament: "You are young. You want to have a career? Remember that in the past elections 95 percent of you were not returned to office. You think the people are not watching, that they are not judging? They are watching. They are not stupid."
There are hands that didn’t want these elections to take place, because it changes the configuration of the senate, which is now very powerful. Chaos is good for a few sectors, and the most destabilising factor here today is drug trafficking, whether by plane or by ship. And it’s polluting politics
The recovery of Haiti - justice system, health, education - should be planned over 10, 15, 20 years. We now have a good relationship within the region, with Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and it’s a new paradigm for regional cooperation. They have their own interests, of course, but let’s make the best of the opportunities that are offered to us.
Michael Deibert is a Senior Fellow at New York’s World Policy Institute and the author of "Notes from the Last Testament: The Struggle for Haiti" (Seven Stories Press).
Some thoughts on impunity and Africa
Flying home to Paris from a reporting trip to Haiti and a brief visit to the United States earlier this week, I read former United Nations’ secretary general Kofi Annan’s eloquent and impassioned op-ed concerning the subject of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Africa in the International Herald Tribune.
In his article, Annan, notes that the ICC now has 108 signatory states, including 30 African countries, representing the largest regional bloc among member states. Beyond that, five of the court’s 18 judges are African and, in Annan’s word, “the ICC reflects the demand of people everywhere for a court that can punish these serious crimes and deter others from committing them.”
One cannot read Annan’s words, of course, without thinking of the ICC’s indictment of Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, which calls for al-Bashir’s arrest on five counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war crimes for his actions connected to the conflict in the Sudanese region of Darfur, a crisis which the United Nations itself estimates has killed at least 200,000 people. The indictment against al-Bashir, a sitting head of state, uses quite similar language to charges laid out against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo, two of the militia leaders in the Ituri conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the early part of this decade. Nevertheless, opposition and criticism of al-Bashir’s indictment has become something of a cause célèbre among some in progressive circles, as well in the halls of power in Africa itself, who charge (without acknowledging such bodies as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) that the African leader is being unfairly singled out. Since the indictment, al-Bashir, far from being treated as a pariah, has been fêted at capital’s across the continent.
“We have little hope of preventing the worst crimes known to mankind, or reassuring those who live in fear of their recurrence,” Annan writes in his article, “if African leaders stop supporting justice for the most heinous crimes just because one of their own stands accused.”
Reading Annan’s Op-Ed, I was reminded of a recent review I wrote of Columbia University professor Mahmood Mamdani’s book Saviors and Survivors : Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror, in which Mamdani argued, among other things, that none of the charges laid against al-Bashir by the ICC “can bear historical scrutiny.”
Leaving aside the question of the veracity of such a statement for a moment, the experience I had in attempting to get the review published I found instructive in terms of the way that ideology can often blind even those in the news business to the real suffering of people on the ground in a place such as Darfur, which along with the Democratic Republic of Congo (which I have reported on) and Somalia is the site of perhaps the world’s worst humanitarian crisis at present.
I pitched the idea for the review and received approval to write it from Inter Press Service editor Terna Gyuse, who has served as Africa regional editor for IPS since the departure of the rigorous and excellent Jacklynne Hobbs in 2008, a period since when, in my view, the quality and objectivity of the African reportage from the organization has slackened noticeably. After reading the book carefully, checking its footnotes and writing a highly critical review based on what I found to be Mamdani’s ideological polemicism and bad history (as typified by his absurd characterization of the charges against al-Bashir), I submitted the review to Gyuse, who took three weeks before finally rousing himself to a response. Opting to kill the review, ostensibly because of its length, Gyuse then ran in its place an interview with Mamdani, of roughly equal length, during which the latter holds forth at length in a manner that evidently matches up more squarely with Gyuse’s own ideological prejudices and desire to pander to the global intellectual establishment. The review I wrote was eventually published on the website of the AlterPresse news service and then republished on the site for the Social Science Research Council.
One cannot blame the reporter, of course, who is just doing her job by interviewing newsworthy people, or even less Mamdani, who has every right and indeed responsibility to see that his views get a wide hearing, no matter how wrong-headed I may feel them to be. But one can blame the editorial process at IPS, an organization that promotes itself as as “civil society's leading news agency,” but which seems more and more determined to silence independent, critical voices if they do not conform to what appears to me to be the organization’s increasingly ideological slant, one which seeks to avoid confrontation with elements of the the establishment left that help fund its existence at every turn.
It is really necessary to rock the boat, even among one’s own colleges, at certain times to keep them and the process honest and make sure that justice, like journalism, serves those in the greatest need of defending. Though I have often differed with Mr. Annan’s policies in places such as Rwanda, I was encouraged and hearted by his article and hope that media outlets such as the Inter Press Service will give space to similarly well thought out critiques that challenge ideological orthodoxy no matter where it occurs. Those in whose name they claim to speak deserve no less.
************************************
Addendum, as if to drive my point home:
AU to shelter Beshir from war crimes warrant: delegates
3 July 2009
SIRTE, Libya (AFP) – The African Union has decided not to cooperate with a war crimes warrant against Sudan President Omar al-Beshir and again appealed to the United Nations to delay the case, delegates said Friday.
Two delegates from different countries said the African Union summit had agreed to a text reading: "The AU member states shall not cooperate... for the arrest and surrender of Sudan President Omar al-Beshir."
The summit was expected later Friday to formally announce its decision, which effectively allows Beshir to travel across Africa without fear of arrest under the warrant for war crimes and crimes against humanity issued by the International Criminal Court.
The text was backed by Libyan leader and current AU chief Moamer Kadhafi, who has said the ICC represents a "new world terrorism," and won support from many countries who felt the court was unfairly targeting Africans.
Thirty African states have signed the Rome statutes creating the court, and have treaty obligations to arrest Beshir if he travels on their territory.
But the text adopted at the summit voices frustration felt by many African nations who say the UN Security Council ignored an early AU resolution calling for a one-year delay to the indictment.
The UN Security Council can ask the court, via a resolution, to suspend investigations or prosecutions for 12 months, under Article 16 of the Rome Statute. The stay can be renewed.
In his article, Annan, notes that the ICC now has 108 signatory states, including 30 African countries, representing the largest regional bloc among member states. Beyond that, five of the court’s 18 judges are African and, in Annan’s word, “the ICC reflects the demand of people everywhere for a court that can punish these serious crimes and deter others from committing them.”
One cannot read Annan’s words, of course, without thinking of the ICC’s indictment of Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, which calls for al-Bashir’s arrest on five counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war crimes for his actions connected to the conflict in the Sudanese region of Darfur, a crisis which the United Nations itself estimates has killed at least 200,000 people. The indictment against al-Bashir, a sitting head of state, uses quite similar language to charges laid out against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo, two of the militia leaders in the Ituri conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the early part of this decade. Nevertheless, opposition and criticism of al-Bashir’s indictment has become something of a cause célèbre among some in progressive circles, as well in the halls of power in Africa itself, who charge (without acknowledging such bodies as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) that the African leader is being unfairly singled out. Since the indictment, al-Bashir, far from being treated as a pariah, has been fêted at capital’s across the continent.
“We have little hope of preventing the worst crimes known to mankind, or reassuring those who live in fear of their recurrence,” Annan writes in his article, “if African leaders stop supporting justice for the most heinous crimes just because one of their own stands accused.”
Reading Annan’s Op-Ed, I was reminded of a recent review I wrote of Columbia University professor Mahmood Mamdani’s book Saviors and Survivors : Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror, in which Mamdani argued, among other things, that none of the charges laid against al-Bashir by the ICC “can bear historical scrutiny.”
Leaving aside the question of the veracity of such a statement for a moment, the experience I had in attempting to get the review published I found instructive in terms of the way that ideology can often blind even those in the news business to the real suffering of people on the ground in a place such as Darfur, which along with the Democratic Republic of Congo (which I have reported on) and Somalia is the site of perhaps the world’s worst humanitarian crisis at present.
I pitched the idea for the review and received approval to write it from Inter Press Service editor Terna Gyuse, who has served as Africa regional editor for IPS since the departure of the rigorous and excellent Jacklynne Hobbs in 2008, a period since when, in my view, the quality and objectivity of the African reportage from the organization has slackened noticeably. After reading the book carefully, checking its footnotes and writing a highly critical review based on what I found to be Mamdani’s ideological polemicism and bad history (as typified by his absurd characterization of the charges against al-Bashir), I submitted the review to Gyuse, who took three weeks before finally rousing himself to a response. Opting to kill the review, ostensibly because of its length, Gyuse then ran in its place an interview with Mamdani, of roughly equal length, during which the latter holds forth at length in a manner that evidently matches up more squarely with Gyuse’s own ideological prejudices and desire to pander to the global intellectual establishment. The review I wrote was eventually published on the website of the AlterPresse news service and then republished on the site for the Social Science Research Council.
One cannot blame the reporter, of course, who is just doing her job by interviewing newsworthy people, or even less Mamdani, who has every right and indeed responsibility to see that his views get a wide hearing, no matter how wrong-headed I may feel them to be. But one can blame the editorial process at IPS, an organization that promotes itself as as “civil society's leading news agency,” but which seems more and more determined to silence independent, critical voices if they do not conform to what appears to me to be the organization’s increasingly ideological slant, one which seeks to avoid confrontation with elements of the the establishment left that help fund its existence at every turn.
It is really necessary to rock the boat, even among one’s own colleges, at certain times to keep them and the process honest and make sure that justice, like journalism, serves those in the greatest need of defending. Though I have often differed with Mr. Annan’s policies in places such as Rwanda, I was encouraged and hearted by his article and hope that media outlets such as the Inter Press Service will give space to similarly well thought out critiques that challenge ideological orthodoxy no matter where it occurs. Those in whose name they claim to speak deserve no less.
************************************
Addendum, as if to drive my point home:
AU to shelter Beshir from war crimes warrant: delegates
3 July 2009
SIRTE, Libya (AFP) – The African Union has decided not to cooperate with a war crimes warrant against Sudan President Omar al-Beshir and again appealed to the United Nations to delay the case, delegates said Friday.
Two delegates from different countries said the African Union summit had agreed to a text reading: "The AU member states shall not cooperate... for the arrest and surrender of Sudan President Omar al-Beshir."
The summit was expected later Friday to formally announce its decision, which effectively allows Beshir to travel across Africa without fear of arrest under the warrant for war crimes and crimes against humanity issued by the International Criminal Court.
The text was backed by Libyan leader and current AU chief Moamer Kadhafi, who has said the ICC represents a "new world terrorism," and won support from many countries who felt the court was unfairly targeting Africans.
Thirty African states have signed the Rome statutes creating the court, and have treaty obligations to arrest Beshir if he travels on their territory.
But the text adopted at the summit voices frustration felt by many African nations who say the UN Security Council ignored an early AU resolution calling for a one-year delay to the indictment.
The UN Security Council can ask the court, via a resolution, to suspend investigations or prosecutions for 12 months, under Article 16 of the Rome Statute. The stay can be renewed.
Friday, June 19, 2009
A quick note from Haiti
The sun rises at about 5am at this time of the year in Haiti, and so I have been up since then, working, writing, reading articles online and preparing for the day's interviews ahead. I must confess that some of the media coverage of Haiti in the United States at present does give me pause, continuing to portray, as it does, a country on a knife's edge tumbling towards pervasive unrest.
This does not resemble the country I have seen since I returned to Haiti. Despite the sometimes-chaotic demonstrations of student groups advocating for various issues and yesterday's upheaval at the memorial service for the priest Gérard Jean-Juste, during which at least one person was killed by gunfire, Haiti seems to be, on balance and much to my surprise, at at better place than I have ever since it since first visited the country in 1997.
Traveling all over Port-au-Prince yesterday by taxi, tap-tap and moto, including to Jean-Juste's former parish, the Paroisse Sainte Claire in Petite Place Cazeau, I would say that 80% of the city was perfectly calm and marked by the guarded optimism that I have been pleasantly impressed to see since my return here. Of course, though, there are some elements that are very threatened by the idea of a popularly elected government such as René Préval's bringing security, stability and economic development to Haiti, and there are some - journalists included - who will always make the mistake of believing that a few neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince are the entirety of Haiti. But, though the country's problems are still massive, a fragile foundation appears to be being laid for better things to come, which we must all hope for and work for.
An opinion from the ground, if you will.
***********
A few additional thoughts (2:53 pm, Port-au-Prince time): I think that the Haiti as some members of the diaspora see it and the Haiti as the poor majority who actually must carve out a meagre living here every day see it is often a very different place. High-minded debates (and I say that seriously, not sarcastically) about national sovereignty are important and useful, but not a single person I have spoken to since I arrived here has brought up MINUSTAH's presence as a negative. The fact of the matter is that, even three years after the inauguration of a democratically-elected president and legislature, Haiti's state institutions remain pitifully weak and in need of the international support they are now receiving. To paraphrase a friend of mine who was in his case speaking about Guatemala (which also had a UN mission on its soil), Haiti is already a weak state that does not guarantee security or justice or health or education. And until the state can supply that to its citizens, discussions about the politics of sovereignty are just that, words that do nothing at all to ameliorate the suffering and struggle of the vast majority of 9 million Haitians. Bit by bit, though, things seems to be getting ever-slightly better for people here, people who can now more or less go about their lives without living in fear of being murdered by the police, raped by Macoute/Fraph/chimere or whatever the militia du jour is called or disappearing into jail for criticizing the powers-that-be. The UN presence here is a bitter pill, perhaps, unless one considers the alternatives.
This does not resemble the country I have seen since I returned to Haiti. Despite the sometimes-chaotic demonstrations of student groups advocating for various issues and yesterday's upheaval at the memorial service for the priest Gérard Jean-Juste, during which at least one person was killed by gunfire, Haiti seems to be, on balance and much to my surprise, at at better place than I have ever since it since first visited the country in 1997.
Traveling all over Port-au-Prince yesterday by taxi, tap-tap and moto, including to Jean-Juste's former parish, the Paroisse Sainte Claire in Petite Place Cazeau, I would say that 80% of the city was perfectly calm and marked by the guarded optimism that I have been pleasantly impressed to see since my return here. Of course, though, there are some elements that are very threatened by the idea of a popularly elected government such as René Préval's bringing security, stability and economic development to Haiti, and there are some - journalists included - who will always make the mistake of believing that a few neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince are the entirety of Haiti. But, though the country's problems are still massive, a fragile foundation appears to be being laid for better things to come, which we must all hope for and work for.
An opinion from the ground, if you will.
***********
A few additional thoughts (2:53 pm, Port-au-Prince time): I think that the Haiti as some members of the diaspora see it and the Haiti as the poor majority who actually must carve out a meagre living here every day see it is often a very different place. High-minded debates (and I say that seriously, not sarcastically) about national sovereignty are important and useful, but not a single person I have spoken to since I arrived here has brought up MINUSTAH's presence as a negative. The fact of the matter is that, even three years after the inauguration of a democratically-elected president and legislature, Haiti's state institutions remain pitifully weak and in need of the international support they are now receiving. To paraphrase a friend of mine who was in his case speaking about Guatemala (which also had a UN mission on its soil), Haiti is already a weak state that does not guarantee security or justice or health or education. And until the state can supply that to its citizens, discussions about the politics of sovereignty are just that, words that do nothing at all to ameliorate the suffering and struggle of the vast majority of 9 million Haitians. Bit by bit, though, things seems to be getting ever-slightly better for people here, people who can now more or less go about their lives without living in fear of being murdered by the police, raped by Macoute/Fraph/chimere or whatever the militia du jour is called or disappearing into jail for criticizing the powers-that-be. The UN presence here is a bitter pill, perhaps, unless one considers the alternatives.
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Papua New Guinea: Time to explore
Papua New Guinea: Time to explore
Published: June 12, 2009
Foreign Direct Investment
Remote yet resource-rich, Papua New Guinea has started to spark the attention of foreign investors, although tenacity is paramount, reports Michael Deibert.
(Read the original here)
In Papua New Guinea’s Madang province, hundreds of Chinese workers at the vast Ramu Nico nickel and cobalt project are the face of a remote nation confronting its ever-more attractive position on the global investment market.
Consisting of ethnic groups speaking more than 800 languages, Papua New Guinea (or PNG, as it is ubiquitously referred to in-country) has been richly endowed with other natural resources of a sort that international firms have only recently begun to fully explore.
The Madang mine, a $1.4bn undertaking by the China Metallurgical Group Corp (MCC), is the largest construction project in the country; it employs between 3000 and 3500 workers and will employ more than 4000 people when it is fully operational.
Bridging gaps
Consisting of a pair of sites that overlook some of the world’s most virgin tropical forests, accessibility to the mine has been vastly improved by MCC’s construction of a 250-metre bridge across the Ramu River, which ranks as one of the longest bridges in the country. A trip that once necessitated an eight-hour walk through dense forest now takes about 40 minutes from the river.
“When I first came here, there was no infrastructure and sometimes the road wasn’t passable,” says Liu Tian Hua, an engineer working on the project. “Living and working conditions are still very hard here but I think that we are making a profit both for MCC and for the local people, so I am very proud to work on this.”
PNG is often referred to as ‘the land of the unexpected’, and MCC has certainly found that to be the case. There have been strikes at the Madang mine by workers complaining of low wages and in November 2008, 213 Chinese employees were arrested, accused of entering the country with improper permits. However, MCC is gradually learning how to do business in the country, and cites a 2.5% ownership stake in the Madang mining that has been granted to a quartet of local landowner groups.
“In China, land belongs to the government, but here, land belongs to the landowners,” says James Wang, MCC vice-president for operations in the PNG capital, Port Moresby. “We need to make them see a real benefit from this, otherwise we can’t survive here. The Chinese team is becoming familiar with these issues and more confident with them.”
Political stability
One issue in PNG’s favour in recent years has been the relative stability brought to the country’s often-turbulent political scene by the seven-year tenure of prime minister Michael Somare, the longest period in office by a national leader since the country achieved independence from Australia in 1975. Veteran observers say that this political calm has been beneficial to the country’s economic development.
“We’ve had booms and busts, but the whole drive has been to keep the exploration and the resource industry going,” says Greg Anderson, executive-director of the PNG Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, an association that collectively represents the interests of those industries in the country. “PNG is in one of the most healthy macro-economic states it has been in for a long time because we’ve had a period of stability. And for the past three or four years we have had very good prices right across the board for agricultural products as well as mineral resources,” he says.
PNG’s GDP was estimated to have grown in 2008 by a robust 6.3%, while its GDP per capita was estimated to be a modest $2300. The country’s links with former colonial power Australia remain extensive, with Canberra supplying $300m in aid, almost 20% of the national budget, during fiscal year 2007/08.
The biggest foreign investment partnership with Australia in recent years is perhaps the PNG government’s involvement in a $11bn liquid natural gas (LNG) project operated by ExxonMobil Corporation and designed to filter gas southward via a pipeline to Australia.
Pipeline potential
An economic impact study on the LNG programme, prepared by Australian consultant ACIL Tasman, said that the project “has the potential to transform the economy” of PNG, potentially doubling the country’s GDP from K8.65bn ($3.17bn) in 2006 to an average K18.2bn a year. With the country’s mining revenues predicted to begin declining in about 2013 when many mines reach the end of their economic life, projects such as the LNG endeavour could become increasingly important to the country’s economic livelihood.
“We see this project as being potentially viable in a range of economic areas where the state would continue to benefit,” says Peter Graham, venture manager for ExxonMobil’s PNG LNG project. “The project is developing more than just the gas, it is also about developing PNG’s capacity, to leave a sustainable positive influence on the country.”
One hindrance in the country’s development, however, has been a persistent, pervasive nucleus of corruption that has had a strong influence on PNG’s body politic.
A 2007 report by PNG’s Public Accounts Committee, a constitutional body responsible for monitoring the spending of public money and quoted by the Berlin-based international corruption watchdog Transparency International, said that it found “evidence of misapplication, fraud, negligence, dishonesty and disregard for the law and for the welfare of the state and its citizens by public servants at every level in every inquiry held”. The lone exception, the report said, was PNG’s department of labour. The report also criticised “a clear web of organised and systemic illegality, designed to access public money in an illegal manner”.
Both Prime Minister Somare and the minister for public enterprises, Arthur Somare (the prime minister’s son), declined requests for comment for this article.
“The resources available to the PNG government are considerable and they should be much wealthier than they are,” says Jenny Hayward-Jones, director of the Myer Foundation Melanesia Programme at the Lowy Institute, an international policy think tank based in Sydney. “They’ve managed [the resources] quite well, but they haven’t actually delivered many benefits to their people. They are not making any progress on social indicators, health indicators are going backwards, education indicators are going backwards – they have been in decline over the past 10 years,” she adds.
Health issues
In contrast to all the development and international interest in the country, many of the country’s statistics remain grim, with an infant mortality rate of 46.67 deaths per 1000 live births and an estimated 6% of the population infected by the HIV virus. However, it is anticipated that the country’s vigorous mineral potential will help it to ride out the global financial crisis to construct a more economically viable and diversified state.
“We’ve got a very high level of exploration at the moment,” says Greg Anderson, whose Port Moresby office overlooks a backdrop of construction cranes. “And we hope that we’ll be able to nurture that through the current downturn,” he adds.
Published: June 12, 2009
Foreign Direct Investment
Remote yet resource-rich, Papua New Guinea has started to spark the attention of foreign investors, although tenacity is paramount, reports Michael Deibert.
(Read the original here)
In Papua New Guinea’s Madang province, hundreds of Chinese workers at the vast Ramu Nico nickel and cobalt project are the face of a remote nation confronting its ever-more attractive position on the global investment market.
Consisting of ethnic groups speaking more than 800 languages, Papua New Guinea (or PNG, as it is ubiquitously referred to in-country) has been richly endowed with other natural resources of a sort that international firms have only recently begun to fully explore.
The Madang mine, a $1.4bn undertaking by the China Metallurgical Group Corp (MCC), is the largest construction project in the country; it employs between 3000 and 3500 workers and will employ more than 4000 people when it is fully operational.
Bridging gaps
Consisting of a pair of sites that overlook some of the world’s most virgin tropical forests, accessibility to the mine has been vastly improved by MCC’s construction of a 250-metre bridge across the Ramu River, which ranks as one of the longest bridges in the country. A trip that once necessitated an eight-hour walk through dense forest now takes about 40 minutes from the river.
“When I first came here, there was no infrastructure and sometimes the road wasn’t passable,” says Liu Tian Hua, an engineer working on the project. “Living and working conditions are still very hard here but I think that we are making a profit both for MCC and for the local people, so I am very proud to work on this.”
PNG is often referred to as ‘the land of the unexpected’, and MCC has certainly found that to be the case. There have been strikes at the Madang mine by workers complaining of low wages and in November 2008, 213 Chinese employees were arrested, accused of entering the country with improper permits. However, MCC is gradually learning how to do business in the country, and cites a 2.5% ownership stake in the Madang mining that has been granted to a quartet of local landowner groups.
“In China, land belongs to the government, but here, land belongs to the landowners,” says James Wang, MCC vice-president for operations in the PNG capital, Port Moresby. “We need to make them see a real benefit from this, otherwise we can’t survive here. The Chinese team is becoming familiar with these issues and more confident with them.”
Political stability
One issue in PNG’s favour in recent years has been the relative stability brought to the country’s often-turbulent political scene by the seven-year tenure of prime minister Michael Somare, the longest period in office by a national leader since the country achieved independence from Australia in 1975. Veteran observers say that this political calm has been beneficial to the country’s economic development.
“We’ve had booms and busts, but the whole drive has been to keep the exploration and the resource industry going,” says Greg Anderson, executive-director of the PNG Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, an association that collectively represents the interests of those industries in the country. “PNG is in one of the most healthy macro-economic states it has been in for a long time because we’ve had a period of stability. And for the past three or four years we have had very good prices right across the board for agricultural products as well as mineral resources,” he says.
PNG’s GDP was estimated to have grown in 2008 by a robust 6.3%, while its GDP per capita was estimated to be a modest $2300. The country’s links with former colonial power Australia remain extensive, with Canberra supplying $300m in aid, almost 20% of the national budget, during fiscal year 2007/08.
The biggest foreign investment partnership with Australia in recent years is perhaps the PNG government’s involvement in a $11bn liquid natural gas (LNG) project operated by ExxonMobil Corporation and designed to filter gas southward via a pipeline to Australia.
Pipeline potential
An economic impact study on the LNG programme, prepared by Australian consultant ACIL Tasman, said that the project “has the potential to transform the economy” of PNG, potentially doubling the country’s GDP from K8.65bn ($3.17bn) in 2006 to an average K18.2bn a year. With the country’s mining revenues predicted to begin declining in about 2013 when many mines reach the end of their economic life, projects such as the LNG endeavour could become increasingly important to the country’s economic livelihood.
“We see this project as being potentially viable in a range of economic areas where the state would continue to benefit,” says Peter Graham, venture manager for ExxonMobil’s PNG LNG project. “The project is developing more than just the gas, it is also about developing PNG’s capacity, to leave a sustainable positive influence on the country.”
One hindrance in the country’s development, however, has been a persistent, pervasive nucleus of corruption that has had a strong influence on PNG’s body politic.
A 2007 report by PNG’s Public Accounts Committee, a constitutional body responsible for monitoring the spending of public money and quoted by the Berlin-based international corruption watchdog Transparency International, said that it found “evidence of misapplication, fraud, negligence, dishonesty and disregard for the law and for the welfare of the state and its citizens by public servants at every level in every inquiry held”. The lone exception, the report said, was PNG’s department of labour. The report also criticised “a clear web of organised and systemic illegality, designed to access public money in an illegal manner”.
Both Prime Minister Somare and the minister for public enterprises, Arthur Somare (the prime minister’s son), declined requests for comment for this article.
“The resources available to the PNG government are considerable and they should be much wealthier than they are,” says Jenny Hayward-Jones, director of the Myer Foundation Melanesia Programme at the Lowy Institute, an international policy think tank based in Sydney. “They’ve managed [the resources] quite well, but they haven’t actually delivered many benefits to their people. They are not making any progress on social indicators, health indicators are going backwards, education indicators are going backwards – they have been in decline over the past 10 years,” she adds.
Health issues
In contrast to all the development and international interest in the country, many of the country’s statistics remain grim, with an infant mortality rate of 46.67 deaths per 1000 live births and an estimated 6% of the population infected by the HIV virus. However, it is anticipated that the country’s vigorous mineral potential will help it to ride out the global financial crisis to construct a more economically viable and diversified state.
“We’ve got a very high level of exploration at the moment,” says Greg Anderson, whose Port Moresby office overlooks a backdrop of construction cranes. “And we hope that we’ll be able to nurture that through the current downturn,” he adds.
Monday, June 15, 2009
Measuring the Drowned and the Saved in Sudan
Measuring the Drowned and the Saved in Sudan
A Review of Mahmood Mamdani’s Saviors and Survivors : Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror
15 June 2009
A Review of Mahmood Mamdani’s Saviors and Survivors : Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror
15 June 2009
By Michael Deibert
(Please read the original article here)
The conflict in the Darfur region of western Sudan, along with the ongoing conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia, represents one of the most vexing challenges on the African continent confronting the international community today.
A dispute which the United Nations estimates has killed at over 200,000 people and displaced at least 2 million since 2003 [1], the conflict in Darfur has seen Sudanese military and government-aligned militia forces (the latter collectively know as janjaweed) squaring off against an array of rebel groups who in recent years have splintered into an ever-shifting tapestry of alliances.
Mahmood Mamdani, a professor of government and anthropology at New York’s Columbia University, is the latest in the line of academics to try and make sense of Sudan’s tangled history with Saviors and Survivors : Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror (Pantheon Books), a book whose bile unfortunately overwhelms its reason.
Mamdami theorizes that the international movement calling for international intervention to halt the violence in Darfur is essentially a deliberate extension of the Bush-era “War on Terror” doctrine of preemptive military action, a doctrine which led to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. While this a thesis certainly worth exploring, the chief problem with Mamdani’s book is that the author reveals a vision so stilted and distorted by the Iraq debacle that he seems to only be able to view all of world history - including that of Sudan - through its lens.
When Mamdani unfavorably compares the mobilization against the Iraq war as tepid in comparison to the mobilization against the Sudanese government’s actions in Darfur, one wonders if he is unaware of the massive demonstrations that took place in early 2003 demanding that no military action be launched in Iraq. A demonstration that took place in New York in February of that year numbered around 100,000 protesters, numbers that those seeking to halt the violence in Darfur could never dream of approaching in sheer scale.
But advocacy itself is a problem, Mamdani argues, pouring particular scorn on the Save Darfur Coalition, a U.S. based grouping of nearly 200 religious, political, and human rights organizations of varying political stripes.
Sneeringly dismissing the group as a collection of “the Christian Right and Secular Zionist groups,” “the humanitarian intervention lobby” and “African American and Christian groups,” Mamdani assails, without apparent irony, the tendency of Save Darfur to “rely on the evidence of their eyes and avoid any discussion of context.”
Mamdani recounts Save Darfur’s organizational structure - boringly normal to anyone familiar with the workings of non-governmental organizations - as if revealing a smoking-gun about the illuminati at the Darfur debate’s core. Though grudgingly granting that the movement “initially had the salutary effect of directing world attention” to the horrendous violence in Darfur. it now “must now bear some of the blame for delaying reconciliation,” a seeming wild overstatement of the group’s lobbying power.
Leaving aside the fact the Save Darfur is part of a global, not national, solidarity movement with the victims of Darfur’s violence (a movement which includes organizations such as Urgence Darfour in France), some of Mamdani’s more damming claims would appear not to stand up upon further inspection. His assessment that Save Darfur’s minutely-detailed maps of the tide of ethnic cleansing in the region are “a full blown pornography of violence...almost none of it telling you when it happened,” is simply false. Satellite evidence on the group’s website is marked with both the month and the year of attacks and the destruction of buildings therein [2].
Perhaps the book’s most troubling aspect, one that is of a piece with some of Mamdani’s more outlandish claims about the Save Darfur coalition, is a worrisome pattern of simplification and omission when digging into the actual mechanics of how the Darfur counter-insurgency was conceived and conducted.
The murderous handiwork of janjaweed leader Musa Hilal is relegated to two sentences in the book’s 398 pages. By contrast, in their 2005 assessment Darfur : A Short History of a Long War, veteran Sudan observers Julie Flint and Alex de Waal wrote of Hilal that “Arab supremacy has converged with criminal impunity, and the result has been cataclysm.” As much as any one individual, Musa Hilal has helped bring Darfur to its current wretched state, but you wouldn’t know it from reading Mamdani’s book.
Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, who seized power in a 1989 coup launched with the support of the National Islamic Front of al-Bashir’s then-ally Hassan al-Turabi, is likewise strangely absent from Mamdani’s analysis, except for Mamdani’s claim that none of the charges laid against al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC) “can bear historical scrutiny.”
The ICC charges, which call for al-Bashir’s arrest on five counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war crimes [3] are, despite Mamdani’s claims, not a departure from the ICC’s usual mandate, but rather quite similar in their language to charges laid out against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo, two of the militia leaders in the Ituri conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the early part of this decade [4]. Despite this, Mamdani declares that the Sudanese president’s guilt or innocence is less important to Africa than “the relationship between law and politics,” as if the continent is a suitable canvas over which academics to theorize, but not where lawyers and judges can enforce the rule of law
Chronicling the splintering within the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) rebel movements in 2005 - which made the situation even more perilous for Darfur’s long-suffering civilians - Mamdani focuses heavily of the freelance banditry of various rebel factions, with far less attention is paid to the activity of government-aligned militias. Such outrages as the slaughter of over 100 civilians by Sudanese government forces in Darfur in February 2008 [5] go unrecorded, with Mamdani stating flatly at one point that the “Janjawid was not an ideological forces nor the fighting arm of an ideologically driven movement.”
This is simply untrue. Documents obtained from the Sudanese government in 2004 by Human Rights Watch - an organization whose work in Sudan Mamdani almost entirely ignores - demonstrate conclusively to any reasonable obersevor the involvement of the Sudanese state in the recruiting and arming of janjaweed to carry out violence on an ethnic basis [6] . Mamdani’s silence on this score is inexplicable.
As the book progresses, Mamdani’s hyper-focus on actual imperialist history and presumed imperialist intent leads to a schizophrenia in the book that never fully resolves itself.
Often strongly and accurately critical of the actions of the United States in Africa, Mamdani nevertheless quotes, as his base source for the numbers of dead in the conflict, the Government Accountability Office, an arm of the U.S. congress. Mamdani’s seeming relegation of those who did not die directly from violence from his tally of the dead in Darfur, as if war-related starvation and disease leave the human body any less dead than a bullet, is one of the book’s more distasteful arguments.
Similarly, though, according to Mamdani, the United Nations is to be distrusted as a useful tool of neocolonialist designs, reports from UN organizations such as the United Nations Environment Programme are frequently referred to by the author for the apparently lucid analysis which they bring. Mamdani’s colonialism-under-every-rock approach is such that at one point he claims that brutal counterinsurgency methods originated with “colonial era settler wars against Amerindians,” which must come as news to anyone who has ever read Tacitus’ 2,000-year old account of the Roman conquest of Britain, or Thucydides’ even older History of the Peloponnesian War.
Mamdani also has an unfortunate tendency to make sweeping statements which he is unable to back up with evidence in his text. While he writes that the January 2005 report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations found the government of Sudan not guilty of pursuing a policy of genocide, the actual wording of the report is a bit more muddled, reading in part as follows [7] :
The crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing, at least as far as the central Government authorities are concerned...the Commission does recognize that in some instances individuals, including Government officials, may commit acts with genocidal intent.
Stating as unchallenged fact that one of the main rebel groups, the JEM, was “developed” by Hassan al-Turabi (a charge that both al-Turabi and the JEM have denied) is an assertion that Mamdani never proves, despite repeating it several times throughout the book. The same goes for Mamdani’s contention that former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell made his famous September 2004 declaration that genocide was taking place in Darfur “under pressure.”
Mamdani’s tone when writing about the Sudanese themselves can often be jarring in its arrogance. Non-combatant Sudanese who call for an international military mission in Darfur are guilty of a “meager knowledge of developments” in their own country, while those issuing the same calls from within Darfur itself suffer from “naiveté.”
Despite the book’s flaws, through its middle half, Mamdani is relatively sober, and surveys the dramatic litany of coups, counter-coups and violent political skirmishes following Sudan’s 1956 independence from Britain in thorough if rather wooden fashion. Accurately pointing the finger at the governments of Ronald Reagan and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi for their roles in stoking regional conflicts throughout the 1980s, Mamdani neglects to explore in any depth the latter’s history of regional destabilization through support for brutal rebel armies such as Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia and Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front.
Towards the end of Saviors and Survivors, Mamdani charges that “the Save Darfur lobby in the United States has turned the tragedy of the people of Darfur into a knife with which to slice Africa.” Going several steps further from this vituperative attack, he charges that the push to hold the authors of Darfur’s agony accountable for their actions is in fact “really a slogan that masks a big power agenda to recolonize Africa.”
Such strident statements do precious little to illuminate the actual dynamic - the context, as Mr. Mamdani would say - of the suffering of the disenfranchised, left at such loose ends and defenseless in the villages and refugee camps of Darfur and eastern Chad.
Despite its dismissive attitude towards the actual victims of violence in Sudan and their concerns, upon finishing Saviors and Survivors it is their voices - voice one searches for in vain in the book itself - that the reader most wishes to at long last hear.
…………………….
Michael Deibert is a Senior Fellow at New York’s World Policy Institute who reports frequently on Africa. He is the author of Note from the Last Testament : The Struggle for Haiti (Seven Stories Press).
Notes
[1] United Nations and Darfur Fact Sheet, published by the Peace and Security Section of the United Nations Department of Public Information, August 2007. [2] Eyes on Darfur, Amnesty International project funded by the Save Darfur Coalition. http://www.eyesondarfur.org/ [3] 3. Case The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, International Criminal Court. http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/ [4] Case The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, International Criminal Court. http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/ [5] “They Shot at Us as We Fled : Government Attacks on Civilians in West Darfur,” Human Rights Watch, May 2008. http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/ [6] "Darfur Documents Confirm Government Policy of Militia Support," Human Rights Watch, 20 July 2004. http://www.hrw.org/legacy/ [7] Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General 25 January 2005. www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_
Wednesday, June 10, 2009
Reporters sans frontières and Mumia Abu-Jamal
Early on the morning of December 9, 1981, Daniel J. Faulkner, a 25 year-old Philadelphia police officer, was murdered by Mumia Abu-Jamal, an occasional journalist who was at the time of the killing driving a taxi cab. In a case that has been percolating in the United States criminal justice system for decades, that finding was reinforced in April, when the United States Supreme Court opted not to order a new trial to revisit Abu-Jamal’s 27 year-old conviction for Faulkner’s murder on Locust Street near Twelfth Street that December night.
But despite Abu-Jamal’s conviction, despite his confession to prison volunteer Philip Bloch in the early 1990s that he had in fact murdered Faulkner, despite his prolific and verbose body of work that has never offered up any alternative account of what happened on the night that Officer Faulkner was shot to death, the odd cult that surrounds Abu-Jamal continues to thrive. Cause du jour celebrities such as the author E. L. Doctorow, the actors Ed Asner and Mike Farrell and Danielle Mitterrand, the widow of former French President François Mitterrand (a man who enthusiastically supported murderous African dictators without the slightest twinge of conscience during his 14 year presidency) proclaim Abu-Jamal’s innocence. Indeed, France, in particular, where I make my home, has never seemed to be able to get over its rather puzzling affection for Abu-Jamal. In 2001, Paris Mayor Bertrand Delanoë, a member of France’s largely lily-white, nearly moribund Parti Socialiste and never one to pass up an opportunity for rank political opportunism, declared Abu-Jamal an honorary citizen of the City of Lights, while the Parisian suburb of Saint-Denis named a street after him in 2006. No similar such honors have been forthcoming for Daniel Faulkner, sadly.
Building on France’s moral and legal dissonance when it comes to the Abu-Jamal case, today Reporters sans frontières, an organization whose work supporting press freedom around the world I have often lauded on this blog and elsewhere, today made what is probably the worst decision in its 25-year history. Hitching themselves to the “Free Mumia” bandwagon, RSF writes that Abu-Jamal “was known as the voice of the voiceless for speaking out as a reporter against governmental abuses and corruption...Although Mumia Abu-Jamal was not arrested and sentenced to death in his professional capacity, it is certainly likely that his status as an activist and committed journalist was a driving force.”
With honest journalists risking their lives in countries every day, it would be hard to think of a more irresponsible position that RSF could take on the Abu-Jamal care. As the journalist Buzz Bissinger described in his terrific exposition of the Abu-Jamal story and the cult that surrounds in the August 1999 issue of Vanity Fair (included below), far from being a star journalist, at the time of his arrest Abu-Jamal sounded much like a man spiraling out of control, only tangentially connected to the profession of journalism. And, what’s more, as Bissinger demonstrates in his article, far from being an innocent persecuted for his political beliefs or his journalistic endeavors, there is compelling evidence that Mumia Abu-Jamal ran across Locust Street with a gun in his hand on that December night in 1981 and killed Daniel Faulkner.
The journalists around the world practicing their profession honestly, aggressively, under great threat and financial strain, deserve better than to have an organization that claims to represent their interests tarnish the name of their profession for which they risk their lives by linking it in this way to a criminal like Mumia Abu-Jamal. Hopefully, RSF will reconsider its decision to advocate for Mumia Abu-Jamal in this manner and re-focus its attention where it belongs, on the brave men and women of the independent press struggling to maintain freedom of expression throughout the world.
****************************************************************************************
But despite Abu-Jamal’s conviction, despite his confession to prison volunteer Philip Bloch in the early 1990s that he had in fact murdered Faulkner, despite his prolific and verbose body of work that has never offered up any alternative account of what happened on the night that Officer Faulkner was shot to death, the odd cult that surrounds Abu-Jamal continues to thrive. Cause du jour celebrities such as the author E. L. Doctorow, the actors Ed Asner and Mike Farrell and Danielle Mitterrand, the widow of former French President François Mitterrand (a man who enthusiastically supported murderous African dictators without the slightest twinge of conscience during his 14 year presidency) proclaim Abu-Jamal’s innocence. Indeed, France, in particular, where I make my home, has never seemed to be able to get over its rather puzzling affection for Abu-Jamal. In 2001, Paris Mayor Bertrand Delanoë, a member of France’s largely lily-white, nearly moribund Parti Socialiste and never one to pass up an opportunity for rank political opportunism, declared Abu-Jamal an honorary citizen of the City of Lights, while the Parisian suburb of Saint-Denis named a street after him in 2006. No similar such honors have been forthcoming for Daniel Faulkner, sadly.
Building on France’s moral and legal dissonance when it comes to the Abu-Jamal case, today Reporters sans frontières, an organization whose work supporting press freedom around the world I have often lauded on this blog and elsewhere, today made what is probably the worst decision in its 25-year history. Hitching themselves to the “Free Mumia” bandwagon, RSF writes that Abu-Jamal “was known as the voice of the voiceless for speaking out as a reporter against governmental abuses and corruption...Although Mumia Abu-Jamal was not arrested and sentenced to death in his professional capacity, it is certainly likely that his status as an activist and committed journalist was a driving force.”
With honest journalists risking their lives in countries every day, it would be hard to think of a more irresponsible position that RSF could take on the Abu-Jamal care. As the journalist Buzz Bissinger described in his terrific exposition of the Abu-Jamal story and the cult that surrounds in the August 1999 issue of Vanity Fair (included below), far from being a star journalist, at the time of his arrest Abu-Jamal sounded much like a man spiraling out of control, only tangentially connected to the profession of journalism. And, what’s more, as Bissinger demonstrates in his article, far from being an innocent persecuted for his political beliefs or his journalistic endeavors, there is compelling evidence that Mumia Abu-Jamal ran across Locust Street with a gun in his hand on that December night in 1981 and killed Daniel Faulkner.
The journalists around the world practicing their profession honestly, aggressively, under great threat and financial strain, deserve better than to have an organization that claims to represent their interests tarnish the name of their profession for which they risk their lives by linking it in this way to a criminal like Mumia Abu-Jamal. Hopefully, RSF will reconsider its decision to advocate for Mumia Abu-Jamal in this manner and re-focus its attention where it belongs, on the brave men and women of the independent press struggling to maintain freedom of expression throughout the world.
****************************************************************************************
The Famous And The Dead
By Buzz Bissinger
Vanity Fair, August 1999
Daniel Faulkner was a police officer with a square face and arching eyebrows, an everyday cop riding a patrol car in the quirky and restless hours before dawn. Already that night Faulkner had accompanied a seven-year-old alleged rape victim to the hospital. But this was the graveyard shift in the red-fight belly of the city, where the ghosts of the night always came out most vividly-muggers yanking gold chains from necks, runners on 10-speed bikes hired by pimps to make sure the prostitutes were being productive, the flow of beer in sodden after-hours bars.
At 25, he had been a cop in Philadelphia for five years, and he had aspirations that didn't reach too far-maybe a long career as a police officer, maybe a career as a prosecutor in the district attorney's office, maybe a little getaway house in the Poconos if he and his wife, Maureen, could scrape together another $10,000. There had been talk of kids between the two of them-how many, what sex was preferred. But the marriage was young then, barely a year old. He had adapted to the fact that she was a cook without potential. She had adapted to his life as a policeman: the crazy hours of shift work, the nagging queasiness that every police wife endures, knowing that something unexpected could always happen.
It had hit home earlier that year, when a fellow officer of Faulkner's, Pete Dailey, was injured in an explosion. The Faulkners had visited him in the hospital, and on the way home Maureen had expressed, for the first time, the fear she felt for her husband's safety. "I love police work," he had said in response. "And if anything happens to me, life goes on." It was the kind of statement that cops like to make-slightly fatalistic, slightly macho-and she didn't take it as an ominous harbinger. He had cooked dinner that night. Then he had sat at the table, paid bills, and put aside some money for Christmas shopping. Running late, he had decided to dress at home, white T-shirt, blue police shirt, blue uniform sweater to ward off the chill of early December. He left the two-bedroom row house in the southwest section of Philadelphia at 11:30 pm.
His shift had nearly reached its midpoint when he pulled his his patrol car, 612, behind a light blue Volkswagen Beetle near the dimly lit corner of 13th and Locust Streets. Faulkner had apparently stopped the Beetle for some sort of traffic violation. But at 3:51 A.M. something caused Faulkner to radio for a wagon-a clear indication that he had decided to make an arrest.
612: 1 have a car stopped ... 12, 13th and Locust.
Radio: Car to back 612, 13th and Locust.
612: On second thought send me a wagon 1234 Locust.
A police car then swung out in the direction of Faulkner. But as it was doing so, a passerby frantically stopped the vehicle, and an officer immediately put out a broadcast over the radio.
"We just got information from a passerby, there's a policeman shot."
Nine seconds later, when police arrived at the scene, they found that Officer Faulkner was not in the act of making an arrest. Instead, he was sprawled on the sidewalk with two bullet wounds. According to eyewitness accounts and testimony by ballistics experts and the pathologist who examined his body, the first bullet had been fired from approximately 19 inches away. It tore into the left side of Faulkner's upper back, one inch to the left of the midline, almost at the base of his neck. According to the prosecutions reconstruction of the incident, Faulkner returned fire and actually hit the man who had just shot him.
While Faulkner was down on his back, the shooter walked over to him, stood at point-blank range, and continued to fire. One of the bullets hit Faulkner in the face. It erupted in a flash that a witness could clearly see, and Faulkner's entire body jerked from the impact. The bullet, fired from a distance of approximately 12 inches, entered his face five inches below the top of his head, exploded through his nose, tore through the bones of his face, through the bones above his eyes, through his entire brain, through the right parietal bone in the back of his head, and lodged in the right occipital bone. If there was anything merciful about the way. Faulkner died on the night of December 9, 1981, it was this, taken from the testimony of the medical examiner who performed the autopsy:
"Complete instantaneous disability and death."
The deprivations of death row in Pennsylvania are wrenching by any standard- 23 hours of every 24 spent alone in a locked cell, family and loved ones viewed only through Plexiglas, strict rules on the number of personal items that can be maintained. It has been the fate of a former radio broadcast journalist named Mumia Abu-Jamal to have been on death row since 1983 -first in a Gothic-looking prison known as SCI Huntingdon and now in a modem facility, SCI Greene, in the southwest pocket of the state, hard by the West Virginia line, winch from afar looks like a shopping mail. For part of this time, there may have been some negligible comfort in the fact that Pennsylvania had not actually carried out an execution since 1962. But in May. 1995 the state did execute an inmate, and a second execution followed that August.
In 1995 the governor of Pennsylvania, Tom Ridge, signed a death warrant for Abu-Jamal, who on July 2, 1982, had been found guilty by a jury in Philadelphia of the first-degree murder of Officer Faulkner. The jury, composed of 10 whites and two blacks, deliberated for less than six hours before reaching a verdict in the two-week trial. A day later the jury began deliberations on the penalty phase of the trial at 2:27 pm., and reconvened an hour and 53 minutes later, returning a sentence of death.
The warrant was stayed by a state-court judge, putting off for the immediate future any possible execution of Abu-Jamal. Various lawyers have been working on his case for years, and a legal team that has now grown to five attorneys and 13 investigators labors feverishly to get from the federal court what, despite exhaustive appeals, the state courts of Pennsylvania have refused to grant: a new trial for Abu-Jamal on the basis that he is innocent, and that he was convicted in a kangaroo-court-style proceeding that was grotesquely unfair.
"Don't tell me about the valley of the shadow of death," Abu-Jamal has written in one of the two books he has had published while on death row. "I live there." Those who have visited him in prison say his spirit and strength are remarkable. But, however harsh, the rigors of his imprisonment unique. Around the world his case has a cause celebre, making the most famous prisoner simply in America but in the entire world. And it is clear that even on death row the demands of celebrity are never easy. Too many people who want to visit. Too much mail that needs to be answered. Take, for example, the foreign-dignitary dilemma. Last April, Danielle Mitterrand, the widow of former French president Francois Mitterrand, wanted to see the 45-year-old Abu-Jamal in order to express her support and solidarity. So did Dr. Winfried Wolf, a member of the German Parliament. To accommodate them, Abu-Jamal had to juggle his visitors' list. Given that prison officials have a specific limit on the number of visitors-and generally allow an inmate to change that once a month -it became quite a logistical nightmare, according to Abu-Jamal's lead attorney, Leonard Weinglass. With an open slot in the visitors' list, Mine. Mitterrand was able to get in. But Winfried Wolf was not so lucky, a fact that Weinglass found particularly awkward due to the importance of what he characterizes as Abu-Jamal's "German support."
If it isn't the foreign-dignitary dilemma, it's the mail dilemma. Some inmates on death row get no mail, but Abu-Jamal gets batches of it, according to Weinglass, and there's just not enough time to answer all of it. It may be because of the master's degree Abu-Jamal is studying for through the auspices of California State University. It may be because of the regular column he writes about world and domestic affairs (distributed over one of a host of Web sites dedicated to his cause on the Internet). It may be because of the prodigious reading that he does.
And then there are little things that also require his time: the statement of thanks he recently wrote to a teachers' union in Rio de Janeiro for conducting walkouts on his behalf, a decision on how to allocate the $90,000 that Weinglass says was raised from a benefit concert; the guards who seek his advice on where to send their children to college; the taped commencement message he recently sent to the Evergreen State College in Olympia, Washington.
"He doesn't have time," Weinglass says of the mail". "When I go in to see him, he asks me to contact this one, contact that one, apologize, tell them I'm busy." But Weinglass is hardly complaining, since his days in the cauldron of high-profile cases go all the way back to 1969, when he and William Kunstler represented the defendants in the Chicago Seven trial. "The worst thing that can happen to anyone in the criminal-justice system is to be a number, to be faceless and a number," says the lawyer, whose resume also includes the Pentagon Papers criminal case; the Angela Davis murder trial; the defense of the kidnappers in the Patty Hearst trial; and a trip to Peru on behalf of Abimael Guzman, the leader of the Shining Path guerrilla group, whose war with the government led to the deaths of nearly 30,000 people. "The best thing that can happen to anyone in the criminal-Justice system is to have outside support."
While efforts to gain a new trial have been rejected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on two separate occasions, the support for Abu-Jamal shows no signs of stopping. Last April, rallies held the same day in San Francisco and Philadelphia attracted a combined 25,000 people. Several months earlier, a controversial benefit concert on behalf of Abu-Jamal, featuring Rage Against the Machine and the Beastie Boys, played to a sold-out crowd of 16,000 at the Continental Airlines Arena in New Jersey.
When Weinglass first became involved, in 1992, support for the death-row inmate was still relatively small. But then the mainstream media discovered him, irresistibly drawn to the novelty of a prison inmate- a death-row prison inmate no less- with radio and writing skills too good to pass up.
In 1994, National Public Radio signed Abu-Jamal up to do commentaries on prison life and issues of crime on the popular afternoon show All Things Considered. NPR backed off after a vigorous protest. But the swirl of publicity over NPR's flipflop only made him hotter. In 1995 the Addison-Wesley publishing house, responding to a proposal from a literary agent, published a book of writings by Abu-Jamal called Live from Death Row.
Support from Hollywood also picked up in a major way in 1995 after Governor Ridge signed the warrant of execution. ailing members of the literary community rallied around Abu-Jamal as well. In the summer of 1995, a full-page advertisement contending the convicted killer had received an unfair trial appeared in The New York limes. It was signed by a glittering array of individuals from the Hollywood, writing, and academic communities, including Maya Angelou, Alec Baldwin, Derrick Bell, Noam Chomsky, E. L. Doctorow, Roger Ebert, Ganter Grass, Spike Lee, Norman Mailer, Paul Newman, Joyce Carol Oates, Tim Robbins, Salman Rushdie, Susan Sarandon, Oliver Stone, and William Styron.
Support for Abu-Jamal continued to build on an international basis, much of it fueled by overwhelming opposition to the death penalty. France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain are among a raft of countries that have abolished the death penalty during the past 20 years, in contrast to the United States, where executions are carried out with numbing regularity. As a radio journalist in Philadelphia, Abu-Jamal had enjoyed a certain degree of success, friends and former colleagues say, before unraveling both professionally and personally to the point where his occupation at the time of the shooting was that of cabdriver. But from the canyons of death row his career resurged and skyrocketed, and now Abu-Jamal takes offense at those who describe him as a "former" journalist.
"Calling me a former journalist is like calling me a former human being," he said in an interview in 1995. "I've published more than 90 percent of the Black and white journalists in America." His cause and his case go beyond writing contracts. There is the honorary law degree he received from the New College of California School of Law in San Francisco. There are the honorary citizenships bestowed upon him by a district of Copenhagen in Denmark and the city of Palermo in Italy. There is the call for clemency by South African archbishop Desmond Tutu, 71 members of the Danish Parliament, Elie Wiesel, Jesse Jackson, and Martin Sheen. There is the sabotage of an edition of the San Francisco Chronicle, in which Abu-Jamal supporters took thousands of copies of the paper from news racks and wrapped a virtually identical-looking four page section around each one demanding a new trial for the convicted killer.
A growth industry has sprouted on his behalf, a mass of merchandising at rallies and college lectures that any movie studio would envy-books, CDs, videos, T-shirts, tote bags, jackets, whistles, candies, buttons, mouse pads ("You can have Mumia or your choice of political prisoner," a woman selling the mouse pads helpfully offered at a recent rally).
Some support Abu-Jamal because they believe, regardless of his guilt or innocence, that he received a trial riddled with problems before a judge notorious for his pro-prosecution leanings. Some support him because of their opposition to the death penalty. Some believe he is the victim of a frame-up by a Philadelphia Police Department that had a national reputation for brutality and racism in the 1970s.
They have found in Abu-Jamal the perfect spokesman and symbol, and the ingredients of star quality which are an absolute requisite for any cause in the culture of today, a Madison Avenue dream of the death-row inmate whose image can sell and sell big-a man with a radio voice as tranquil as a lullaby, a man who can write with a clarity made all the more remarkable by the fact that he has spent nearly 20 years of his life in incarceration, a man of clear sex appeal with that interesting chemistry of sultry eyes and hanging dreadlocks, a man who laces his writings with just the right dash of revolutionary spice so as to be provocative. In the past 12 months, more than $200,000 in donations poured in to just one of his many support groups.
He has been transformed into a mythic figure, canonized at almost every opportunity-an outspoken revolutionary and hero to millions, in the words of one of the band members of Rage Against the Machine; a man similar in spirit to Mandela, in the words of novelist Alice Walker. Abu-Jamal himself, in a rare interview with a member of the mainstream media in 1995 (attempts, both in writing and through his lawyer, made by Vanity Fair to interview Abu-Jamal were unsuccessful), said he was uncomfortable with his role as a symbol. But those who once worked with him wonder. "The guy's a worldwide celebrity," says a former colleague. "I don't know if late at night he says, 'What the fuck have I gotten into? Look at what I've accomplished.'"
Whatever the motivation, the beat of Abu-Jamal goes on. And, there may be only one thing to mar it all: compelling evidence Abu-Jamal ran across Locust Street with a gun in his hand on that December night in 1981 and killed Daniel Faulkner.
In addition to the evidence, a former volunteer for a prison-reform organization who regularly visited Abu-Jamal has come forward with what he says was an admission by the inmate to the killing. In the early 1990s, Philip Bloch was an active participant in the Pennsylvania Prison Society. He was also a student at Juniata College in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania, the town where Abu-Jamal was incarcerated. Bloch says that he had at least 10 conversations with Abu-Jamal in prison, and that it was during one of them when he asked the inmate, "Do you have any regrets about killing the officer?"
"Yes" was Abu-Jamal's reply, according to Bloch.
When police arrived at the scene, they not only saw Faulkner with blood pouring out of his face, but also saw Abu-Jamal sitting in close proximity, on the curb.
Raised in a housing project in Philadelphia, Abu-Jamal developed his political activist beliefs in earnest in 1969, when, a 15, he co-founded the local chapter of the Black Panther Party and became its "minister of information." Known in high school as a strong student, he was also expelled for his radicalism. Those who knew Abu Jamal say that he never lost his ideological beliefs about the system and the intense degree of oppression against minorities. But Abu-Jamal also became part of the journalistic mainstream, working at a variety of commercial radio stations in Philadelphia. At a certain point in his life, he was highly regarded, with a voice that seemed born for the airwaves-rich, velvety, beautiful. Some saw in him the kind of talent, particularly in his ability to evoke mood and atmosphere, that could have led him as far as he wanted to go in the radio business. Others admired him for the way he had managed to bridge the gap between traditional journalism and social activism by doing stories on the disadvantaged.
But in the months before the shooting, according to colleagues, it was a talent that he had basically jettisoned. His last full-time job had been as a reporter with WHYY, the local public-radio station in Philadelphia. He had started at the station in the summer of 1979, and for some of that time, as a member of a staff putting out a local version of All Things Considered called 91 Report, much of his work had been of high quality.
But he was something of a manipulator, say those who worked with him, particularly since he knew that his talent was in demand. "I wanted it to work," says a former colleague. "I wanted his voice and I wanted the voice he represented on the air. I'm not at all surprised at his ability to get people to buy into what he wants them to, because that's what he did to me."
In January of 1981, Philadelphia magazine listed Abu-Jamal in its group of "81 to Watch." But the mention seemed almost silly. Colleagues say that his work habits at the station had begun to deteriorate seriously.
Increasingly, other reporters had to cover for him because he could not be found. Former journalistic colleagues say there were indications that he was having personal and financial problems. And he was increasingly falling into lockstep with a militant and radical group in Philadelphia called MOVE. In May 1980, nine of its members had been convicted in the death of a police officer during a shoot-out. And because Abu-Jamal frequently covered MOVE for the station, there were constant concerns over his reportorial bias, to the point where it wasn't uncommon for entire pieces to be re-edited. "His behavior at the station was really out of control," says a former colleague. "He looked like a guy who was high. He acted like a guy who was high."
Toward the end, Abu-Jamal had become a "virtual no-show," according to another former colleague. Then, after he vanished for three days with the station's staff car, he was asked to resign.
In the media, Abu-Jamal has been portrayed as a journalist whose reportage on police brutality and misconduct, particularly in the aftermath of the move shoot-out, made him an open target for the police department. "To uniformed men in mourning for one of their own," wrote Doctorow," he was an enemy delivered to their mercies."
The statement is powerful and provocative, and it adds to the legend that has blossomed around Abu-Jamal since his incarceration. Abu-Jamal reported of topics, including the police, according to Weinglass. In one of his books, Abu-Jamal recounted an incident in which an officer in a patrol car, upon seeing him, smiled and molded his fingers into the shape of a gun.
But by numerous accounts Abu-Jamal did virtually no original reporting on police brutality, and Weinglass acknowledges that he doesn't know whether any of the officers arriving on the scene that night had any idea of who he was.
"I was involved right in the middle of this whole police-misconduct business," says George Parry, who was in charge of the unit of the district-attorney's office that was established in 1978 to prosecute police officers for excessive force. "Mumia Abu-Jamal just was not a factor. I don't have any recollection of having spoken to him. It appears to be a triumph of propaganda over truth. You have to give him credit for that. The notion that Jamal has been framed because he was a critic of the police is just a hideous lie."
William Marimow, whose reportage on police brutality (along with Jonathan Nueuman's) earned The Philadelphia Inquirer the Pulitzer Prize for public service a 1978, also has no recollection of Abu-Jamal ever doing anything on the subject. "I was very attuned to everyone who wrote about Philadelphia police violence," says Marimow, now the managing editor of the Baltimore Sun. "This guy didn't register a blip on my radar screen."
In writings on his behalf, Abu-Jamal has been described as a "widely acclaimed" journalist when he worked in Philadelphia, a "voice of the voiceless." But after his departure from WHYY, says a former friend, he actually became a "lost voice, his voice was lost." This friend saw in him an increasing grimness as his obsession With MOVE intensified. And while he never saw Abu-Jamal react violently to anything (Abu-Jamal had no criminal record before the shooting), he did sense in him "a lot of pent-up emotion. Some of it was anger. Some of it was frustration. Frustration at his inability to make the media a platform for [his] sociopolitical views."
From time to time, Abu-Jamal visited the city-hall newsroom where he had once been a fixture, but there was less and less to talk about with his acquaintances there. "I wasn't so anxious to see Mumia after a while," says the former friend. "Brief conversations would lapse into this disaffection with the media. By that time he was no longer an effective sounding board for me. He had become so disconnected."
The friend thought Abu-Jamal was basically lost, straddling two worlds. "He found himself neither part of the revolution nor part of the mainstream," he says. "What the hell was he?"
By the time Abu-Jamal was found on the curb by the police, he wasn't working as a radio journalist at all. Instead, he was driving a cab. "Mumia was not an award-winning, crusading journalist when he killed this cop," says a former colleague. "He was a journalist who had lost his job, who was having a personal crisis."
Others who knew Abu-Jamal vigorously dispute that description. E. Steven Collins, a highly regarded radio figure in Philadelphia who became quite close to Abu-Jamal, said he never saw any change in his temperament after the split from WHYY. Several hours before the shooting, Collins said, Abu-Jamal came to his house for spaghetti. He "was in a great mood," said Collins, and stayed until 11 pm.
When Police Officer Robert Shoemaker approached Abu-Jamal about five hours later, he was sitting at the end of the curb, with a bullet wound in his chest from Faulkner's gun. Abu-Jamal's right arm was crossing his chest, Shoemaker later said in testimony, and his left hand was on the ground. Shoemaker ordered Abu-Jamal to freeze, but instead, said Shoemaker in court, Abu-Jamal's arm started to move to his left. Shoemaker again ordered Abu-Jamal to freeze. It was then that Shoemaker saw a gun approximately eight inches from Abu-Jamal's hand. When Abu-Jamal did not halt, according to testimony, the officer kicked him in the throat to get him away from the gun. Abu-Jamal then fell backward, saying, "I'm shot. I'm shot."
It would later be determined that the gun Shoemaker saw- a .38 Charter Arms undercover special worn in a shoulder holster-belonged to Abu-Jamal and had been purchased by him nearly two and a half years earlier. The gun had five empty cartridges in its chamber. While subsequent ballistics examination by the prosecution could never specifically match the bullet extracted from Faulkner's skull to Abu-Jamal's gun, it was determined that the bullet's markings-eight lands and eight grooves with a twist to the right-were consistent with the type of revolver that belonged to Abu-Jamal.
Lawyers working for Abu-Jamal have offered a variety of theories about what happened that night, but the one they refer to the most is that Faulkner was shot by an unknown gunman who then fled. But in statements given to the police roughly within an hour of the incident, four different witnesses-none of whom knew any of the others-described crucial stages of Abu-Jamal's actions at the scene. Three of those witnesses made their identification of Abu-Jamal directly at the scene. (The fourth could not identify Abu-Jamal that night, but at trial correctly identified the clothes he had worn.)
The assistant district attorney who tried the case, Joseph McGill, points out, "This is not a situation where someone was arrested and brought back to the scene. In this case, [Abu-Jamal] never left the scene, because he was shot in the chest. You cannot get a better identification than that."
Not all of those witnesses saw every single moment of the fatal shooting. Only one testified to actually seeing Abu-Jamal with a gun in his hand. But another testified that he had heard the shots and then seen Abu-Jamal stand over the officer, with his hand in the clear gesture of firing. Taken together, the accounts of those four witnesses formed a consistent picture of what happened that night:
The driver of the Volkswagen, who happened to be Abu-Jamal's younger brother William Cook, was spread-eagled against the side of the car. Cook, 25, turned to take a swing at Faulkner, and Faulkner responded with force of his own, perhaps a flashlight or a billy club. Abu-Jamal, whose cab was parked across the street, then came running through a parking lot. He fired at least one shot at Faulkner's back and Faulkner fell. Abu-Jamal stood at Faulkner's feet and fired several more times, hitting Faulkner in the face. Abu-Jamal sat down on the curb, obviously debilitated by the bullet wound to his chest. Meantime, Abu-Jamal's brother stood by the wall along the sidewalk with a shocked expression on his face. (When police arrived at the scene, Cook's first-and only-words about what had happened were not in defense of his brother, or about a gunman who had fled the scene. They were: "I ain't got nothing to do with it.")
Of the four witnesses who testified for the prosecution, two were hardly angels. The only witness who said she saw the gun was a woman named Cynthia White, whose record included at least 38 arrests for prostitution. Another witness, who said he saw Abu-Jamal in an up-and-down motion of firing a gun, was a cabdriver named Robert Chobert, who was on probation for throwing a Molotov cocktail into an empty school building. Despite his vocation, his driver's license had been suspended. White's record of past arrests was made known to the jury. Chobert's conviction was not, because the judge ruled that it was inadmissible on the legal basis that it was not a crime indicating falsehood. Both witnesses were intensively cross-examined by the attorney representing Abu-Jamal, and their accounts of what happened that night remained firm. "I know who shot the cop and I ain't going to forget it," Chobert testified in 1982.
Two other witnesses, a Philadelphia police officer and a security guard at the hospital where Abu-Jamal was taken, testified that they heard Abu-Jamal confess to shooting Faulkner. Officer Garry Bell said he heard Abu-Jamal say in the hospital, "I shot that mother fucker and I hope the mother fucker dies." Bell did not, however, report hearing the confession until 77 days after the crime had occurred, prompting the defense to suggest vigorously that he had concocted what he heard (particularly given that another police officer who had been with Abu-Jamal the night of the shooting filed a report stating that the suspect had made comments). But the security guard Priscilla Durham, also testified having heard Abu-Jamal say at the hospital, "I shot the mother fucker and I hope the mother fucker dies." Furthermore, she testified that she had reported the statement to hospital investigators the next day.
Prosecutor McGill doesn't describe the evidence as simply strong. Instead, he calls the case against Abu-Jamal "the strongest homicide case I have ever tried," during a career that spanned approximately 125 homicide cases before McGill went into private practice, in 1986. The testimony of the eyewitnesses, says McGill, was "absolutely unavoidable in terms of truth.... [Abu-Jamal] never left the scene. He was identified by witnesses who never left the scene." The only thing more persuasive, he says, would have been a video-camera recording of what happened.
After reading the trial transcript, one could reasonably conclude that, in terms of fairness, there were some potentially troubling developments. There was the fact that the case was tried before a judge, Albert Sabo, with a reputation for being pro-police and pro-prosecution, raising immediate questions about the impartiality of any trial he presided over. There was the question of whether Abu-Jamal's efforts to represent himself were unfairly denied by Sabo in the midst of jury selection (the judge justified the action on the basis that Abu-Jamal was taking too long and scaring potential jurors with his approach). There was the possibility that the resources allotted by the court for Abu-Jamal's representation, roughly $14,000, were simply inadequate by any standard, since he was facing the death penalty. There was the question of why there was no testimony on his behalf either from a ballistics expert or from a pathologist. There was the question of why witnesses who might conceivably have been helpful in advancing the defense theory that another person had shot Faulkner were never called. There was the question of why a residue analysis on Abu-Jamal's hands was not done on the night of the shooting. A prosecution expert said at trial that such a test becomes invalid as soon as someone touches his trousers or wipes his hands. Because of the way Abu-Jamal struggled with the police during his arrest, there was ample opportunity for loss of residue, but an expert retained by the defense after the trial said that such tests were "frequently performed when a suspect was apprehended immediately after a shooting incident."
Given that the shooting of Faulkner occurred so suddenly and that Abu-Jamal himself was shot, some observers also wondered why a claim of self-defense was not more actively pursued.
Virtually all of these issues were raised on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, and denied. At the root of the verdict was Abu-Jamal's own conduct acting out to the point where one newspaper columnist wrote that his behavior was as "bizarre as it was suicidal."
On numerous occasions the judge, after repeated warnings, had Abu-Jamal removed for continued disruptions and verbal outbursts such as these:
"I need the microphone at the table."
"You have ruled, Judge? This is not to my satisfaction."
"I don't care what you believe."
"I'm not finished. We are not finished."
McGill has always believed that Abu-Jamal's behavior had been calculated to create a record that could be used in a later appeal to claim that the trial was unfair. "He wanted to make the trial a political show in which he was the victim," says McGill. "Once he was prevented from taking complete control of the forum, he then aggressively became a negative force of his defense."
Weinglass says that Abu-Jamal began to act up in court only after his right to represent himself was taken away. In fact, Abu-Jamal's behavior had been disruptive during the previous proceedings against him. At a pre-trial hearing about a month earlier, he had called the presiding judge a "bastard" and had told him to "go to hell."
Much of what Abu-Jamal's defenders have claimed, however tantalizing, is still unsubstantiated despite nearly eight years of investigation. Weinglass concedes that Abu-Jamal headed across the street that night from the parking lot after seeing his brother grapple with Faulkner. But it is his theory that Faulkner, in the act of trying to subdue one black male and seeing another black male running at him, took out his gun and shot Abu-Jamal. Faulkner in turn was shot by someone else, who fled the scene.
At lengthy hearings in 1995 and 1996 in Philadelphia, lawyers seeking a new trial for Abu-Jamal called six witnesses to indicate that someone else had done the shooting. But three of them, in statements given years earlier or in their own testimony during the hearings, had said they did not witness the actual shooting but saw someone fleeing only after shots had been fired.
The fourth, who said that Faulkner had been shot by a passenger in the Volkswagen, also said that there was a helicopter with a searchlight on the scene (no other witnesses saw a helicopter) and that Faulkner, after being shot in the head, whispered, "Get Maureen ... get the children."
If in fact Faulkner had already been shot in the face, as the witness said, it would have been virtually impossible for Faulkner to talk. Furthermore, he had no children. The fifth witness said that Faulkner was shot by two different people, an assertion that was contradicted by all physical and medical evidence in the case. The sixth ended up giving brief testimony that substantiated the prosecutions account of what happened that night.
Much of what Abu-Jamal's supporters point to, while deeply troubling (such as the fact that 115 of the 130 prisoners on Pennsylvania's death row from Philadelphia are members of a minority), has nothing directly to do with the facts of the case. It also seems apparent that some of the most recognizable figures supporting Abu-Jamal are doing so without having read the complete trial transcript.
"I don't remember what portions I read. I obviously didn't have the entire transcript," says E. L. Doctorow, who in 1995 wrote an op-ed piece in the New York Times on behalf of Abu-Jamal. But Doctorow also says that a full reading of the transcript is not necessary to see the obvious unfairness of the proceedings, and that efforts to dismiss reports for Abu-Jamal as the predictable leanings of "armchair liberals and sentimental bleeding hearts" are convenient and misguided.
"There is one issue here," says Doctorow. "Whether he got a fair trial or not. I don't know whether he is guilty or innocent. From the details of the trial and the portions of the transcript I read, any impartial juror would regard it as something of a fiasco. It's inconceivable to me that unless someone has some political stake they would not want some further examination of this whole thing."
Actor Ed Asner, another high-profile supporter of Abu-Jamal's, has also not read the entire trial transcript. "Could I stay awake?" he replies when asked the question.
Like Doctorow, Asner says his involvement in the case has nothing to do with Abu-Jamal's guilt or innocence, but with the issue of trial fairness. "Even if he is guilty, I find that errors and mistakes, the rancor and the severity of his sentencing, to be too damned much," says Asner, pointing to the two and a half months it took for the police officer to report Abu-Jamal's confession and to the lack of a residue test on Abu-Jamal's hands. "I've been reading selective pieces, but it all smells."
Actor Ossie Davis, who along with actor Mike Farrell co-chairs a committee that raises funds for Abu-Jamal's defense and has been actively involved in a number of death-penalty cases, says that he sees no point in reading the entire trial transcript. "We the people, in a democracy, are not going to read the transcript of all the cases that come before us. I take the word of attorneys, the word of people who have investigated."
"We're not asking, 'Let the man go. Free political prisoners.' We think the facts as we know them merit a new trial for Abu-Jamal."
Alice Walker, who gave an endorsement for Abu-Jamal's first book, says that she has read "tons and tons of everything" about the case, but that it is her recollection that she has read "bits and pieces" of the trial transcript. Nevertheless, she has come to an emphatic conclusion about the case that she says reminds her of the raciest frame-ups that took place in the Deep South. "I don't have any doubt that Mumia was framed," says Walker. "None. In fact, what I think happened is that he was actually trying to help Faulkner."
Walker has visited Abu-Jamal twice in prison, and her impression of him is distinct. "He is just beautiful," she says. "He is a beautiful person. He is intelligent. He is compassionate. He has a lot of light. He reminds me of Nelson Mandela."
Buoyed by such support, Abu-Jamal's legal team, which has already spent several hundred thousand dollars, continues to scour for new witnesses. It also continues to suggest new possibilities of how Faulkner was killed, including one recently made by Weinglass that the officer may have been set up for execution by members of his own department because of a suspicion that he was an F.B.I. informant in an investigation of police corruption. He offers no concrete proof for this theory-just one loop-the-loop of conspiracy after another. The very fact that he would suggest it conveys a certain desperation on the part of the defense in trying to suggest an alternative version of what happened that night. But it also gives supporters one more theory to disseminate over the Internet and preach on college campuses, a myth that, if repeated enough, could begin to carry the authority of absolute truth.
Philip Bloch says that it was a reaction of "disgust" to Abu-Jamal's supporters that made him come forward several months ago with what he says was an admission by Abu-Jamal to killing Faulkner. Bloch says he learned of Abu-Jamal as part of his volunteer work for the Pennsylvania Prison Society, through another death-row inmate he was working with at the time. He and Abu-Jamal developed an "mutual friendship" grounded in similar backgrounds in the left-wing movement, says Bloch, and talked on a variety of subjects-philosophy, history, prison life. (Discussion of Abu-Jamal's case never came up, perhaps because Bloch, based on his own examination of the case through newspaper clippings, had concluded that Abu-Jamal was almost certainly guilty.)
It was in the course of one such conversation that Bloch talked to Abu-Jamal about the use of violence and whether it might be an acceptable alternative in the advancement of a cause. It was in that context, Bloch says, that he asked Abu-Jamal if he had any regrets over killing Faulkner, and Abu-Jamal replied with a one-word answer of "yes."
"There was a long pause," Bloch remembers. "I think we probably realized what he had just done."
Bloch did not ask Abu-Jamal to elaborate, and the conversation turned toward other subjects. "It wasn't something I planned in advance," he says of the question. "It was just in the flow of the conversation. The opportunity to ask such a question came up, and I asked it." Even without elaboration, Bloch says he was positive that Abu-Jamal understood precisely what had been asked.
"It was directly implied in my statement that he was the one who did it. I don't think there's any possibility of mis communication."
Bloch, a 47-year-old substitute teacher, kept the contents of the conversation to himself for roughly seven years. But in recent months, he says, the tactics of Abu-Jamal supporters increasingly began to gnaw at him. "Maureen Faulkner is being subjected to such calumny. They're trying to vilify the memory of her husband and make it seem like he was some rogue cop that was out beating Mumia's brother. So I see that. That's disgusting enough. I see the level of hatred that's being aroused people towards the police. And I think it's just crossed a line." Combing the Internet one day, Bloch discovered a Web site established by an organization called Justice for Police Officer Daniel Faulkner. He read some of the contents, and sent an E-mail in early April that said: "There is at least one person to whom Mumia has admitted killing Officer Faulkner and that person may be willing to break his silence on the matter." In a second E-mail, Bloch revealed his name and phone number, and has since given a statement to a detective from the Philadelphia Police Department. Bloch says that his decision to come forward was not an easy one. He has not spoken with Abu-Jamal in roughly five years after letters he sent to the inmate went unanswered. But, says Bloch, "I still have a lot of respect for him. I don't think by any means he's proud of what he did. I'm sure that if he had to do it all over again he'd be somewhere else that night." But in the absence of that, says Bloch, "It's a lot easier to live the life now as a martyr than as a cold-blooded cop killer."
In 1994, Maureen Faulkner asked herself whether she would publicly respond to the swell of support for Abu-Jamal, or whether she would simply step aside. The answer came when she learned that NPR was planning to air commentaries by Abu-Jamal on life in prison. "I believe they were going to make him their poster boy," she says. "That was the beginning of it."
She called members of management at NPR, who, she says, told her that Abu-Jamal had a First Amendment right to freedom of speech. "Well, what about my husband, who is six feet under?" she responded. "He's lost his ability for his freedom of speech."
NPR reversed its decision, but Abu-Jamal's radio commentaries later surfaced on the Pacifica Radio Network. Faulkner was driving to work one day from her home in California and was flipping through stations on the car radio when she suddenly heard his voice. She flipped to another station, then flipped back. She started to shake and had to pull off to the side of the highway.
Since that time, Faulkner has consistently gone to battle with those who have promoted the case and cause of Abu-Jamal. When Addison-Wesley published Abu-Jamal's book, in 1995, she personally hired a plane to fly over the publisher's offices in Reading, Massachusetts, with a banner that read, ADDISON-WESLEY SUPPORTS COP KILLERS. In 1996, when she learned that HBO was planning to air a documentary that would leave out key elements pointing to Abu-Jamal's guilt, she wrote a letter to Gerald Levin, the head of Time Warner, which read in part: "The facts of my husband's murder are brutal and crystal clear. All physical evidence and eyewitness testimony has demonstrated over and over again that Mumia Abu-Jamal shot my husband in the back, and while he lay face up and conscious on the sidewalk Jamal emptied his gun into my wounded husband's face."
When she learned that Whoopi Goldberg, who has been a visible supporter of Abu-Jamal's, was helping to host a 50th birthday party for President Clinton, she wrote a telegram to the president that said, "Do you want someone who supports a convicted cop killer to host your 50th birthday? I know the law enforcement across this country will be appalled." (Two months later she received a letter from then chief of staff Leon Panetta that said, "The President certainly does not want to add to your grief and was very sorry to hear of your concerns. Let me assure you, however, that Ms. Goldberg's participation in the President's birthday party does not imply that he endorses her view on this particular matter.")
"I really felt as though I was putting out the fires of hell alone," Faulkner says. "And they were popping up, these fires, throughout the country, throughout the world, and I kept trying to put them out and put them out."
Faulkner has been subjected to blistering attacks on her credibility as well as E-mail missives from supporters of Abu-Jamal that have said, "Fuck you" and "Nobody cares about you or that piece of shit cop that deserved to die" and "Get your head out of your ass."
But Faulkner shows no signs of giving up. "I hope someday there is closure, and I just believe the only way that there will be closure is if ... they follow out what a jury of 12 had decided. I am not the one who convicted Jamal of murder. A jury of 12 did in the City of Philadelphia, where capital punishment is imposed."
In the end, nearly 20 years after the murder of Officer Faulkner, the most intriguing element of Abu-Jamal's case is all that it doesn't say.
There is still the unexplained element of what caused Abu-Jamal and his brother William Cook to be at the red-light intersection of 13th and Locust Streets at close to four in the morning. There is still the unexplained element of why Abu-Jamal, even with a reputation for nonviolence, had purchased a gun two and a half years prior to the shooting. There is still the unexplained element of why William Cook has never publicly said a word about the shooting.
There is also the silence of Abu-Jamal himself. In his books, in his columns, Abu-Jamal has spoken out on virtually everything-the killing of a gay man in Alabama; the killing of Amadou Diallo by police in New York; the bombing in Iraq; Monica and Bill; the brutal treatment he said he received from police the night of the shooting after he was taken to the hospital. But there is one element missing from Abu-Jamal's prolific body of work-any account of what happened that night when Daniel Faulkner was shot to death.
Weinglass insists that Abu-Jamal is eager to tell, what took place as long as it is in the proper legal forum. A hearing in federal court for a new trial would be the appropriate setting, says Weinglass, although he also acknowledges there is no guarantee that such a hearing will ever be granted. "Let's first tell the story the first time in court," says the lawyer. "If we're blocked, we'll see then." Will Mumia go to his execution if it comes to that, without ever telling his story? The answer is obviously no." In the meantime, in the gaping void of that silence, his supporters continue to roar.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
